Quantifying bridge resilience by Stevens, Megan
		 	
	 					QUANTIFYING	BRIDGE	RESILIENCE			By:	Megan	Stevens				A	Thesis		Submitted	in	Partial	Fulfillment	of	the	Requirements	for	the	Degree	of	Master	of	Science	in	Civil	Engineering				Northern	Arizona	University	August	2018				Approved:			Robin	G.	Tuchscherer,	Ph.D.,	Chair			Joshua	T.	Hewes,	Ph.D.,			Brendan	J.	Russo,	Ph.D.		
ii		
ABSTRACT		QUANTIFYING	BRIDGE	RESILIENCE		MEGAN	STEVENS		 Deviations	in	weather	patterns	have	changed	the	demands	facing	the	nation’s	infrastructure.		“Extreme”	weather	events	(i.e.	those	characterized	as	having	a	low	probability	of	occurring	yet	result	in	a	high	consequence)	are	increasing	in	intensity,	frequency,	or	both.		Because	these	changes	are	happening	on	a	relatively	short	timescale,	existing	probabilistic	methods	used	by	engineers	to	model	weather	events	are	increasingly	obsolete.		The	most	effective	approach	for	designing	structures	to	resist	the	effects	of	unpredictable	events	is	to	incorporate	principles	of	resilience	into	their	design.		Resilient	structures	better	adapt,	quickly	recover,	and	minimize	the	destructive	outcomes	of	an	unpredictable	destructive	event.		In	this	paper,	a	method	is	proposed	for	rating	and	quantifying	the	structural	resilience	of	a	bridge.		The	proposed	method	specifically	focuses	on	bridges	and	the	relationship	between	their	resilience	and	structural	inputs.	To	demonstrate	the	extent	of	the	proposed	approach,	four	distinct	bridges	are	chosen	for	a	comparative	case	study.		Each	bridge	falls	into	a	category	with	varying	combinations	of	high	and	low	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings.		Resilience	ratings	are	calculated	for	each	bridge	and	compared	with	their	sufficiency	ratings	to	demonstrate	that	high	sufficiency	is	not	indicative	of	high	resilience.		Both	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	of	bridges	should	be	analyzed	separately	and	in	compliment	with	each	other	when	making	decisions	related	to	their	design,	construction,	and	maintenance.			
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1	Introduction	
1.1 Background	Increasingly	extreme	variations	in	climate	and	weather	patterns	are	placing	greater	strains	on	our	nation’s	infrastructure	and	its	ability	to	adapt.		Transportation	infrastructure	is	at	the	forefront	of	this	battle	against	shifting	weather	patterns	yet	current	design	standards	are	not	keeping	pace	with	these	new	demands.		Highways	and	interstates	are	the	lifelines	of	the	nation’s	economy.		Tens	of	thousands	of	bridges	service	these	routes	and	these	structures	are	susceptible	to	the	extreme	loading	demands	from	extreme	weather	events.		A	disruption	to	the	network	of	interstates	has	a	significantly	unfavorable	consequence	for	the	trucking	industry	and,	subsequently,	the	nation’s	economy.	Currently,	the	Federal	Highway	Administration	(FHWA)	and	the	United	States	Department	of	Transportation	(USDOT)	rate	the	nation’s	bridges	using	a	“sufficiency”	rating.		The	sufficiency	rating	is	a	result	of	the	Structure	Inventory	and	Appraisal	(SI&A)	Report,	which	is	a	component	of	the	bridge	inspection	process.		This	rating,	on	a	scale	from	0	to	100,	is	a	measure	a	bridge’s	structural	condition,	functionality,	and	importance	to	the	user.		However,	a	crucial	disadvantage	is	this	rating	does	not	take	into	account	how	a	bridge	responds,	adapts,	and/or	recovers	from	a	severe	loading	event.		The	rate	which	a	structure	recovers	from	a	potentially	damaging	incident	is	termed	it’s	“resilience”.			Adequately	resilient	infrastructure	has	the	ability	to	adapt	to	unforeseen	changes	and/or	quickly	overcome	a	loss	of	functionality.		An	extreme	event	is	characterized	by	having	a	low	probability	of	occurrence	yet	a	high	consequence.		Because	the	timing	and	magnitude	of	an	extreme	event	is	difficult	to	determine,	it	is	problematic	to	design	for	
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them.		Incorporating	principles	of	resilience	into	design	eliminates	the	need	to	design	for	a	specific	extreme	event	and	allows	the	structure	to	adapt	and	overcome	these	unpredictable	events.	
1.2 Problem	Statement	There	is	a	need	to	quantify	the	level	of	resilience	contained	in	a	bridge.		A	resilience	rating	will	allow	decision	makers	to	best	allocate	funds	for	repairs	and	improvements.	To	meet	this	need,	a	resilience	rating	methodology	for	bridges	is	proposed	based	on	ranks	and	weights	of	specific	structural	indicators.	Although	several	approaches	for	quantifying	resilience	have	been	researched,	they	remain	largely	theoretical	and,	as	a	result,	lack	applicability.	In	response,	a	secondary	goal	of	the	approach	proposed	in	this	thesis	is	to	utilize	as	much	existing	data	as	possible.		This	way,	state	departments	of	transportation	can	easily	implement	the	proposed	methodology	using	information	already	on	hand.		In	addition,	the	connection	between	certain	bridge	components	and	overall	resilience	is	illustrated.	In	order	to	emphasize	the	applicability	of	the	proposed	approach,	a	comparative	case	study	of	four	distinct	bridges	is	performed.		This	case	study	carefully	evaluates	four	bridges	currently	in	the	bridge	inventory	in	the	state	of	Arizona.		The	four	bridges	target	varying	combinations	of	high	and	low	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings.		The	resilience	rating	for	each	bridge	is	calculated	using	information	found	on	the	SI&A	report,	as-built	construction	plans,	and	existing	inspection	documents.		Finally,	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	are	compared	to	assess	their	correlation.		
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1.3 Objectives		The	following	objectives	are	intended	to	meet	the	preceding	project	needs:	
• Determine	bridge	characteristics	that	contribute	to	resilience	
• Develop	a	methodology	for	quantifying	structural	resilience	
• Compare	the	calculated	resilience	rating	to	the	sufficiency	rating	currently	in	use	by	the	Federal	Highway	Administration	
• Allow	for	easy	adaption	of	the	resilience	rating	by	state	departments	of	transportation	
1.4 Thesis	Organization	This	thesis	specifically	addresses	the	resilience	of	transportation	infrastructure,	how	resilience	is	affected	by	structural	inputs,	and	provides	a	measure	to	quantify	resilience.		Chapter	2	will	discuss	the	current	state	of	structural	resilience	and	provide	a	summary	of	significant	research	performed	in	the	area	to	date.		The	background	of	resilience	and	current	proposed	resilience	quantification	procedures	will	be	discussed.		Also,	the	needs	and	goals	of	this	research	will	be	discussed.		Chapter	3	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	methodology	in	calculating	the	resilience	rating.		The	procedure	for	rating	and	weighting	a	bridge	will	also	be	shown.		Chapter	4	will	present	the	results	obtained	calculating	the	resilience	rating	for	each	bridge	in	detail,	including	detailed	explanations	as	to	how	each	rating	and	weight	was	reached.			The	implications	of	the	results	found	will	also	be	discussed.		Chapter	5	will	discuss	the	results	presented	in	chapter	4.		The	comparisons	between	resilience	and	sufficiency	ratings	will	be	discussed.		Also,	a	susceptibility	analysis	will	be	presented	to	display	the	resilience	rating	equation’s	susceptibility	to	change.		
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Chapter	6	will	discuss	applications,	implications,	and	conclusions	drawn	from	the	comparative	case	study.		This	chapter	will	propose	the	adaption	of	the	resilience	rating	into	the	bridge	inspection	process.		In	the	appendices,	sample	calculations	of	ratings	and	weights	will	be	provided.	
5		
2 Background	
2.1 Overview	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	present	the	state	of	the	art	of	structural	resilience	within	the	context	of	this	research.			
2.2 Resilience	In	general,	structural	resilience	is	the	rate	which	a	structure	can	recover	from	damage.		Resilient	infrastructure	is	typically	presented	within	the	context	of	unpredictable	or	extreme	weather	events.		In	this	context,	an	extreme	event	is	categorized	as	having	a	low	probability	yet	high	consequence	of	occurrence.		In	other	words,	it	does	not	occur	frequently	or	may	have	never	happened	before,	but	the	consequences	result	in	substantial	risks	to	the	public,	transportation	system,	or	both.			 	Bruneau	[2003]	defines	resilience	through	three	complementary	measures:		1)	Reduced	time	for	recovery;		2)	Reduced	consequences	to	the	community;	and		3)	Reduced	probability	of	failure.			Bruneau’s	[2003]	study,	which	focused	on	extreme	seismic	events	and	their	effects	on	bridges,	suggested	that	the	proper	quantification	of	resilience	required	a	very	clear	definition.			Bruneau’s	[2003]	definition	of	the	resilience	of	a	structure	comes	from	the	properties	of	robustness,	redundancy,	resourcefulness,	and	rapidity.		Robustness	is	a	structure’s	strength	in	enduring	hardships	or	extreme	events.		Redundancy	is	a	design	
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feature	where	a	single	component	or	series	of	components	of	a	structural	system	can	fail	while	maintaining	functionality	and	integrity	of	the	whole.		Resourcefulness	is	the	adaptability	of	a	structural	system	while	maintaining	functionality.		Rapidity	is	the	rate	of	recovery	from	an	event.		Redundancy	and	resourcefulness	influence	the	rate	which	a	structure	recovers	from	a	damaging	event.			Bocchini	et	al.	[2014]	build	on	Bruneau’s	[2003]	theoretical	foundations	of	resilience	and	conceptualize	it	as	a	“resilience	triangle”.		Resiliency	is	quantified	by	the	triangular	area	defined	by	the	loss	in	functionality	and	rate	of	recovery,	as	defined	in	Equation	2-1	and	illustrated	in	Figure	2-1.	
𝑅 = 100 − 𝑄 𝑡 𝑑𝑡!!!!  
 
Equation	2-1	
Where,			 R=	resilience		 t0=	time	when	damaging	event	is	initiated		 t1=	time	when	structure	is	fully	recovered		 Q(t)=	structural	functionality	
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Figure	2-1:	Resilience	Triangle	[Bocchini	et	al,	2014] As	seen	in	Figure	2-1,	resilience	is	a	function	of	robustness,	rapidity,	and	time.		The	vertical	axis	measures	functionality	where	the	loss	of	functionality	is	defined	as	(1-robustness).		The	horizontal	axis	measures	time.		The	horizontal	leg	of	the	resilience	triangle	represents	the	total	recovery	time.		One	of	the	most	critical	features	of	the	resilience	triangle	is	the	hypotenuse,	which	is	the	recovery	path	of	the	structure	after	the	introduction	of	a	damaging	event	at	time	t0,	until	the	structure	is	completely	functional	at	time	t1.		The	slope	of	the	hypotenuse	is	an	average	approximation	of	the	actual	recovery	path.		This	actual	recovery	path	is	represented	by	Bocchini	et	al.’s	[2014]	equation	for	resilience	(Equation	2-1).			Mackie	et	al.	[2015]	define	resilience	as	the	ability	of	a	structure	to	absorb	external	stimuli	and	regain	functionality.		They	similarly	implement	their	definition	with	the	concepts	of	robustness	and	rapidity.		Robustness	is	associated	with	a	structure’s	ability	to	withstand	and/or	absorb	an	extreme	event,	and	rapidity	is	the	ability	to	recover	from	said	
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event	and	regain	functionality	[Mackie	et	al.	2015].		Mackie	et	al.	[2015]	include	carbon	emissions	in	their	resilience	quantification.		From	their	work,	they	conclude	resilient	structures	emit	less	carbon	throughout	their	design	life	because	they	require	fewer	repairs.	
2.2.1 	Impacts	on	Infrastructure	
2.2.1.1 	Existing	Shortfalls	In	the	past	50	years,	the	average	temperature	of	the	planet	has	increased	by	roughly	0.15°C	to	0.20°C	per	decade	and	has	shown	no	signs	of	slowing	down	[Hansen,	2010].		This	phenomenon	is	having	marked	effects	on	the	intensity	of	droughts,	hurricanes,	flood	events,	and	glacial	melting	[Melillo	et	al,	2014].		This	rise	in	weather	intensity	is	detrimental	to	our	nation’s	infrastructure,	including	roadways,	bridges,	channels,	and	stormwater	systems.			In	the	United	States	alone,	more	than	30%	of	bridges	are	more	than	50	years	old	and,	as	a	result,	nearing	the	end	of	their	design	life	[American	Society	of	Civil	Engineers	(ASCE),	2017].		According	to	ASCE	[2017],	in	the	U.S.,	the	cost	to	rehabilitate	all	of	the	bridges	in	need	of	repair	is	in	excess	of	$120	billion.		However,	current	funding	only	provides	approximately	$18	billion	per	year	for	infrastructure	repair	[American	Society	of	Civil	Engineers,	2017].	Because	of	this	shortfall,	infrastructure	that	is	vulnerable	to	current	weather	demands	may	not	be	upgraded	within	an	appropriate	timeframe.			Dong	and	Frangopol	[2016]	state	it	best:	“The	current	infrastructure	in	the	United	States	is	losing	the	battle	of	probability.”	
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2.2.1.2 	The	Battle	of	Probability	Although	nearly	every	state	in	the	U.S.	had	the	ability	to	record	weather	data	by	the	1850s,	historical	data	only	exists	for	about	the	last	100	years	[Fiebrich,	2009].	Furthermore,	current	climate	models	are	increasingly	obsolete	due	to	the	accelerated	rate	at	which	the	intensity	of	climate	events	is	changing.		In	short,	extreme	weather	events	occur	more	frequently	and/or	with	higher	intensity	than	suggested	by	existing	models.	For	example,	according	to	Huber	and	Gulledge	[2011],	events	in	the	United	States	previously	classified	as	a	500-year	event	now	occur	at	a	rate	comparable	to	a	100-	or	10-year	event.		In	2016,	parts	of	Australia,	Indonesia,	and	southeast	China	saw	rainfall	above	the	historical	90th	percentile	[World	Meteorological	Organization,	2016].		In	contrast,	parts	of	Russia	saw	rainfall	below	the	historical	10th	percentile	in	the	same	year	[World	Meteorological	Organization,	2016].		Thus,	current	weather	patterns	are	not	becoming	drier	or	wetter	than	normal—	rather,	the	entire	world	is	seeing	weather	events	that	are	more	extreme	in	each	direction.	In	addition	to	weather,	the	magnitude	of	natural	disasters	has	been	more	extreme	in	recent	years.		This	phenomenon	is	having	a	drastic	impact	on	not	only	society	and	communities	but	the	economy	as	well.		In	the	2015	Global	Assessment	Report	on	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	[United	Nations	International	Strategy	for	Disaster	Reduction,	2015],	it	is	reported	that	average	annual	losses	due	to	natural	disasters	are	about	$314	billion.		This	estimate	is	solely	based	on	losses	to	the	built	environment	and	does	not	take	into	account	loss	of	life	or	income.		Impacts	from	natural	disasters	are	even	more	detrimental	to	smaller,	developing	countries.		In	fact,	island	communities	are	the	most	at	risk	group	due	to	their	relatively	high	exposure	to	hurricanes	and	earthquakes	and	because	their	access	to	
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supplies	is	limited	[United	Nations	International	Strategy	for	Disaster	Reduction,	2015].		As	a	result,	when	a	tragedy	strikes	these	areas,	it	takes	much	longer	for	the	country	to	recover	both	physically	and	economically.	Recent	hurricane	seasons	have	been	more	severe	than	the	historical	trend.		For	example,	Hurricane	Harvey	hit	southeastern	Texas	in	late	August	2017	and	Hurricane	Maria	hit	Puerto	Rico	shortly	after.		Hurricane	Harvey	caused	$180	billion	in	damages,	over	40	inches	of	rainfall,	record	flooding,	and	80	deaths	[van	Oldenborgh	et	al.,	2017,	NOAA,	2018].		At	the	time	of	writing	this	thesis,	residents	of	Puerto	Rico	still	have	limited	access	to	food,	water,	and	cell	phone	service	[Gomez	and	Jervis,	2017].			The	inertial	forces	from	an	earthquake	are	very	large	for	a	structure	as	massive	as	a	building	or	a	bridge.		Generally,	designing	structures	to	withstand	these	forces	without	damage	is	not	economically	feasible.		Since	the	frequency	of	the	event	is	so	rare,	structures	are	designed	to	withstand	damage	but	not	collapse.		Thus,	with	increasing	frequency	of	seismic	events,	existing	designs	fall	short	of	their	intent.	Finally,	with	recent	changes	in	weather	patterns,	some	regions	are	experiencing	more	frequent	and/or	extreme	droughts.		These	drier	than	normal	conditions	have	caused	agricultural	strains,	ecological	damage,	and	devastating	wildfires	—	the	magnitudes	of	which	are	the	greatest	some	areas	have	ever	experienced.		For	example,	the	popular	wine	region	of	northern	California	experienced	a	fire	season	in	the	fall	of	2017	that	burned	over	245,000	acres,	destroyed	around	8,900	structures,	and	claimed	the	lives	of	43	people,	making	it	one	of	the	most	destructive	California	wildfire	in	terms	of	structures	and	lives	lost	[CalFire,	2017].	
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2.2.2 	Resilience	vs	Sustainability		
2.2.2.1 	Interrelationship	Sustainability	and	resilience,	although	related,	are	not	the	same	construct.		Resilience	is	the	ability	to	recover	after	suffering	a	loss	or	failure	of	functionality	while	sustainability	is	the	ability	to	conserve	resources	during	construction	and	operations.		In	fact,	as	Bocchini	et	al.	[2014]	concluded,	it	is	sometimes	necessary	to	be	resilient	at	the	cost	of	being	less	sustainable.	Most	current	design	practices	either	end	up	focusing	solely	on	resilience	or	solely	on	sustainability.		The	focus	on	one	or	the	other	has	the	effect	that	the	“other”	is	often	overlooked.	Using	this	approach	to	design	or	manage	infrastructure	has	proven	to	be	very	inefficient	[Bocchini	et	al.,	2014].		Rather,	an	optimal	system	is	both	sustainable	and	resilient,	combining	the	positive	aspects	of	both	and	optimizing	them	to	work	in	concert	with	each	other.			
2.2.2.2 	Sustainability	As	a	way	of	practice,	sustainability	gained	popularity	in	the	late	1980’s	and	early	1990’s.		In	1987,	the	World	Commission	on	Environment	and	Development	published	a	special	report,	“Our	Common	Future”	[Brundtland,	1987]	in	which	the	committee	presents	strategies	for	policies	and	regulations	to	reach	more	sustainable	development	and	address	environmental	concerns.		The	report	states	that	the	goal	of	sustainable	development	is	to	“meet	the	needs	and	aspirations	of	the	present	without	compromising	the	ability	to	meet	those	of	the	future”	[Brundtland,	1987].	The	report	suggests	that	sustainable	development	need	not	be	limiting.	Policies	and	practices	can	be	developed	and	improved	to	adapt	to	
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increasing	changes	in	climate.	To	date,	the	biggest	impact	on	sustainable	development	is	due	to	changes	in	public	policy.		The	American	Society	of	Civil	Engineers	defines	sustainability	through	the	“Triple	Bottom	Line,”	where	societal,	environmental,	and	economic	conditions	all	have	an	equal	weight.		From	this	philosophy,	the	sustainability	rating	system	“Envision”	was	created	through	the	Institute	of	Sustainable	Structures	(ISI)	[Minkser,	2015].		This	rating	system	is	much	like	other	rating	systems	that	award	structures	based	on	their	implementation	of	sustainable	concepts	[e.g.	Leadership	in	Energy	and	Environmental	Design	(LEED),	Energy	Star,	Green	Globes,	Net	Zero	Energy	Building	(NZEB),	Building	Research	Establishment	Environmental	Assessment	Method	(BREEAM)	in	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	Living	Building	Challenge	(LBC)]	[Kibert	and	Hakim,	2014	and	Hossaini	et	al.,	2015].		These	rating	systems	operate	similarly	in	that	they	provide	points	and	certifications	for	buildings	using	innovative	technologies	to	become	more	sustainable,	reduce	energy	usage,	produce	less	waste,	or	a	combination.		Envision	is	similar	but	provides	certification	specific	to	civil	infrastructure	by	going	a	step	further	to	determine	if	the	infrastructure	is	appropriate	or	necessary	for	the	current	needs	of	the	community	and	environment	[Minsker,	2015].	
2.2.2.3 	Resilience	While	sustainability	focuses	on	impacts	to	the	natural	environment,	resiliency	focuses	on	consequences	of	failure	and	impacts	on	the	community.		A	resilient	system,	according	to	Bocchinni	et	al.	[2014],	is	“more	reliable,	since	it	has	a	lower	probability	of	reaching	limit	states…fast	recovery…[and]	the	rapidity	of	functionality	restoration…[and]	low	socioeconomic	consequences.”			
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In	the	event	of	a	natural	disaster	or	other	harmful	event,	damage	to	a	non-resilient	structure	can	cause	cascading	negative	consequences	on	a	community.		For	example,	if	water	lines	are	damaged	and	no	alternatives	are	available,	the	community	may	be	without	potable	water	until	lines	are	restored.		Building	failures	are	not	only	harmful	to	a	community—	they	can	also	be	deadly.		Depending	on	the	building’s	use,	members	of	a	community	may	be	out	of	a	home,	place	to	work,	place	to	worship,	or	means	to	life	necessities.			Furthermore,	a	bridge	failure	can	cut	off	a	community	from	essential	resources.		Feasible	detours	may	not	exist	or	may	cause	travelers	to	drive	considerably	out	of	the	way	to	reach	their	destination.	This	leads	to	not	only	driver	frustration	but	also	lost	productivity,	increased	emissions,	and/or	increased	collisions.			
2.2.3 	Current	State	of	the	Art	
2.2.3.1 	Research	In	recent	years,	research	has	shown	that	resilience	is	becoming	a	more	vital	aspect	of	design.	Historically	practiced	in	the	material	science	field,	resilience	has	been	placed	in	new	contexts	increasingly	over	the	last	50	years	[Park,	2013].		The	first	published	research	about	resilience	(not	in	a	material	science	context)	was	from	Crawford	Stanley	(C.S.)	Holling	[1973]	related	to	the	resilience	of	ecology.		In	his	work,	Holling	[1973]	suggests	that	ecosystems	can	be	resilient	if	a	foreign	external	or	internal	stimulus	can	be	absorbed	and	without	entirely	changing	the	ecosystem.		Holling	[1973]	also	states	that	even	though	future	events	are	unknown,	planning	and	preparing	for	unknown	events	is	a	critical	aspect	of	resilience.		
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In	engineering,	there	has	also	been	an	increasing	amount	of	research	in	resilience.	Park	et	al.	[2013]	discuss	resilience	in	engineering	systems.		Alipour	et	al.	[2013]	research	the	resilience	of	bridges	during	combined	low	frequency,	high	consequence	events,	specifically	earthquake	and	scour.		Dong	and	Frangopol	[2016]	focused	on	the	impacts	climate	change	and	extreme	weather	events	have	on	civil	infrastructure.		Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	developed	a	way	to	describe	a	bridge’s	resilience	in	quantitative	terms.		A	common	theme	throughout	this	literature	is	that	the	construction	of	structures	that	can	recover	quickly	from	an	intense	and	unpredictable	weather	event	is	dependent	on	purposeful	integration	of	resilience	principles	into	their	design.			 Design	policies	cannot	quickly	adapt	to	the	changing	environment	because	predicative	models	are	based	on	antiquated	assumptions.		Thus,	infrastructure	needs	to	incorporate	the	adaptability	associated	with	a	resilient	approach.		A	resilient	bridge	system	can	be	“ahead	of”	the	current	standards	of	practice	by	being	designed	to	adapt	to	an	extreme	event	[Dong	and	Frangopol,	2016].					 Currently,	no	national	standard	or	requirement	exists	to	assess	the	resilience	of	a	bridge	in	quantitative	terms.		However,	recent	studies	have	proposed	a	theoretical	framework	for	the	measurement	and	quantification	of	a	bridge’s	resilience	[Dong	and	Frangopol	2016,	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	2012,	Deco	2013,	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	2015].		A	quantitative	measure	would	give	engineers	and	decision	makers	an	objective	and	historical	record	of	a	bridge’s	resilience	over	time.		In	addition,	decision	makers	would	have	information	on	the	state	of	a	bridge’s	resilience	in	order	to	make	decisions	that	are	more	informed.		
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	According	to	Park	et	al.	[2013],	current	practice	incorrectly	merges	resilience	with	risk	when	resilience	is	truly	“an	emergent	property	of	what	an	engineering	system	does,	rather	than	the	static	property	the	system	has.”		Park	et	al.	[2013]	suggest	the	system	should	be	analyzed	as	a	whole	instead	of	investigating	parts	individually	and	that	infrastructure	cannot	be	managed	by	risk	alone.	Identifying	possible	hazards	can	be	difficult	in	the	built	environment	because	many	risks	are	unknown.		It	is	not	viable	to	analyze	risk	if	the	event	that	could	disrupt	the	system	is	unidentifiable.		Resilience	in	engineering	systems	should	be	controlled	and	managed	through	“resilience	analysis.”		It	is	impossible	to	separate	the	two	concepts	of	risk	and	resilience	in	an	engineering	context	due	to	the	deliberate	nature	of	engineering	design.		Only	through	resilience	analysis	are	risk	and	resilience	properly	combined	[Park	et	al.,	2013].		 Park	et	al.	[2013]	suggest	that	resilience	should	be	perceived	as	an	adaptive	process	and	not	a	state.		In	other	words,	a	resilient	design	should	adapt	and	acclimate	to	unforeseen	events.		A	resilient	structure	does	not	lose	functionality	after	an	event	and	does	not	sustain	any	permanent	loss	of	functionality.			With	that	said,	a	structure	is	dynamic	throughout	its	life.		Thus,	to	be	resilient,	routine	inspections,	maintenance,	and	rehabilitation	should	be	performed	throughout	a	structure’s	lifetime.			 Current	practices	put	too	much	faith	and	confidence	in	current	safety	measure	technologies	[Park	et	al.	2013].		For	example,	the	Fukushima	power	plant	disaster	did	not	implement	new	protective	measures	for	the	facility	even	though	earthquakes	and	tsunamis	in	the	area	had	been	accurately	predicted	for	decades	because	the	owners	did	not	want	to	raise	any	suspicion	of	a	potential	disaster	[Park	et	al.	2013].		In	other	words,	if	the	public	thought	that	the	plant	was	unsafe,	the	facility	would	lose	political	and	financial	support.		On	
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the	other	hand,	sometimes	too	much	trust	is	placed	in	existing	safety	systems,	as	seen	in	the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	spill	[Park	et	al.	2013].		Risks	and	warning	signs	were	seen,	but	trust	was	put	into	the	system	as	designed.					 Since	resilient	practices	involve	being	accommodating	and	inventive,	Park	et	al.	[2013]	suggest	the	engineering	process	includes	four	additional	steps.		These	steps	are	“sensing,	anticipation,	adaptation,	and	learning”	(SAAL).		Originally	presented	by	Hollnagel	et	al.	[2006]	and	later	adapted	by	Park	et	al.	[2013],	these	steps	form	the	foundation	of	resilient	engineering	design:			
• Sensing	involves	taking	in	new	stimuli	from	the	system	and	its	environment	and	giving	particular	attention	to	anything	out	of	the	ordinary.		A	stress	that	is	foreign	or	a	sudden	increase	in	demand	should	not	be	overlooked.		They	provide	opportunities	to	better	the	system.			
• Anticipation	occurs	when,	after	recording	and	paying	attention	to	stimuli,	designers	and	operators	can	anticipate	new	events.			
• Adaption	occurs	when	designers	and	operators	are	able	to	anticipate	potential	disasters	or	events	and	can	implement	contingencies.			
• Learning	is	achieved	after	adaptation	occurs	when	designers	plan	for	ways	to	manage	new	stimuli.		This	involves	rehabilitation,	alternative	disaster	management	strategies,	or	designing	for	a	structure	to	fail	safely	or	partially.			From	the	SAAL	framework,	new	ways	of	designing	in	the	same	environment	are	learned	and	implemented.		This	strategy	involves	teamwork	and	communication	between	many	groups	and	may	even	involve	other	disciplines.		Thus,	through	the	SAAL	approach,	resilience	becomes	a	qualitative	approach	to	risk	management.		
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		 Finally,	resilient	design	should	not	be	a	mere	re-design	of	existing	practices.	Being	resilient	in	design	means	being	innovative	and	creative,	which	may	result	in	straying	from	traditional	or	standard	design	practices	[Park	et	al.,	2013].		This	process	may	also	involve	a	change	in	perspective	and	behavior	in	engineers.		Instead	of	practicing	"tried	and	true"	methods	that	have	proved	to	be	insufficient	in	low	probability/high	consequence	events,	a	new	paradigm	emerges	requiring	designers	to	conceive	creative	solutions	for	recovery	from	unforeseen	events.		It	is	improbable	to	know	every	possible	low	probability	event	that	could	cause	damage	to	a	structure,	but	it	is	practical	to	incorporate	structural	resiliency	by	providing	contingencies	to	failure.		Marias	et	al.’s	[2004]	strategy	for	changing	mindsets	resonates:	"It	is	not	necessary	to	predict	all	potential	causes	of	a	ship	sinking	in	order	to	provide	lifeboats	and	other	emergency	measures."			
2.2.3.2 	Examples	of	Resilient	and	Non-Resilient	Design			Although	resilience	is	not	explicitly	incorporated	into	current	design	standards,	there	are	several	ways	structures	can	be	resilient,	such	as	providing	a	safe	to	fail	mechanism	or	increased	redundancy.		Safe	to	fail	design	provides	contingences	for	unpredictable	events.	Similarly,	incorporating	redundancy	into	a	structure’s	design	will	increase	its	resilience	by	allowing	for	multiple	alternative	load	paths.		In	other	words,	if	one	member	of	a	structure	fails,	the	remaining	members	can	still	carry	loads	and	maintain	functionality.			In	1927,	intense	rainfall	caused	the	Mississippi	River	valley	in	southeastern	Missouri	to	flood	to	unprecedented	levels.		It	was	called	the	Great	Flood	of	1927	and,	at	the	time,	was	one	of	the	worst	in	America’s	history	[Mississippi	River	flood	of	1927,	2018].	The	floodwaters	were	so	great	that	the	entire	levee	system	along	the	river	failed.		Over	250,000	
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square	miles	of	land	were	submerged	under	water,	homes	were	destroyed,	thousands	of	structures	were	wiped	out,	and	more	than	250	people	died	[Mississippi	River	flood	of	1927,	2018].		Based	on	the	lesson	from	this	disaster,	The	US	Army	Corps	of	Engineers	(USACE)	built	a	levee	system	in	the	New	Madrid	Floodway	and	included	safe	to	fail	mechanisms	in	the	event	of	another	unprecedented	event.			 In	2012,	when	floodwaters	at	the	confluence	of	the	Mississippi	and	Ohio	Rivers	rose	to	unsafe	levels,	the	USACE	intentionally	breached	the	levees	around	the	New	Madrid	Floodway.		One	of	the	breached	levees	allowed	the	floodwater	to	flow	into	the	floodway,	and	another	allowed	the	floodwater	to	slowly	re-enter	the	river.		This	breaching	caused	133,000	acres	of	farmland	to	be	flooded	[Morton,	2013].		Although	several	farm	buildings	and	homes	were	flooded,	no	lives	were	lost.		Thus,	the	resilient	design	and	management	of	the	New	Madrid	Floodway	and	surrounding	levees	prevented	a	repeat	of	the	1927	catastrophe.					 In	contrast,	the	2015	collapse	of	the	I-10	Tex	Wash	Bridge	in	California	is	an	example	of	how	a	non-resilient	design	can	be	dangerous	and	costly.		The	Tex	Wash	Bridge	on	interstate	I-10,	built	in	the	1960's,	spans	the	Tex	Wash	Dry	River.		This	section	of	the	I-10	connects	Southern	California	to	Phoenix	and	is	a	major	roadway	for	the	trucking	industry.		About	20%	of	the	average	daily	traffic	in	this	portion	of	the	I-10	is	truck	traffic	[FHWA,	2012].		During	the	monsoon	season	in	July	of	2015,	the	Tex	Wash	Dry	River	just	outside	of	Palm	Springs,	California	experienced	a	large	amount	of	rainfall	in	a	very	short	period	of	time.		The	area	experienced	approximately	6.5	in.	of	rainfall	in	less	than	six	hours	[Tabbakhha	et	al.,	2016].		During	this	event,	flash	flooding	caused	the	eastbound	section	of	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	to	collapse.		Because	of	this	collapse,	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	was	closed	
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to	traffic	for	five	days,	costing	the	trucking	industry	an	estimated	$2.5	million	for	each	day	it	was	closed	due	to	detour	lengths	and	delays	[Masunaga,	2015].		Furthermore,	traffic	was	reduced	to	one	lane	in	each	direction	for	two	months	while	crews	worked	to	replace	the	collapsed	bridge.		The	total	cost	to	replace	the	bridge	was	approximately	$8	million	dollars	[Kelman,	2015].			According	to	Tabbakhha	et	al.	[2016],	several	design	flaws	led	to	the	collapse	of	this	bridge.		First,	the	bridge	was	constructed	on	a	shallow	foundation	and	not	a	pile	foundation.		This	caused	floodwaters	to	erode	away	the	soil	under	the	foundation	of	the	bridge,	triggering	the	abutment	to	fail.		Second,	the	original	construction	of	the	bridge	called	for	the	existing	delta-like	dry	river	to	be	condensed	into	a	narrow	channel.		This	was	done	by	adding	soil	to	the	delta	plain,	unnaturally	reshaping	the	flow	of	the	waterway,	resulting	in	a	sharp	turn	in	the	floodwaters	and	a	bottleneck	at	the	location	of	the	abutment	[Tabbakhha	et	al.,	2016].			Although	the	failure	of	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	was	catastrophic,	no	warning	signs	were	present	during	inspections.		The	year	prior,	the	bridge	received	a	91.5	out	of	100	sufficiency	rating	during	inspection	[Kelman,	2015].		There	were	no	major	repairs	or	structural	flaws	according	to	the	inspection	standards	at	the	time.		This	bridge	was	structurally	sound	and	safely	served	its	purpose	for	normal	everyday	conditions.	Nonetheless,	clearly,	when	this	bridge	experienced	an	unforeseen	1000-year	rain	event	on	July	19,	2015	[Tabbakhha	et	al.,	2016],	its	design	proved	to	be	non-resilient.			Another	example	of	a	non-resilient	design	is	the	2007	collapse	of	the	bridge	carrying	I-35	westbound	in	Minneapolis.		The	collapse,	which	happened	during	rush	hour	in	August	of	2007,	killed	13	people	and	injured	over	140.		Several	issues	are	attributed	to	the	
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collapse:	1)	thin	gusset	plates;	2)	unusual	loading;	and	3)	the	lack	of	redundancy	[National	Transportation	Safety	Board,	2008].		This	bridge	was	fracture	critical,	meaning	there	were	no	repeated	members	in	the	primary	structure.		While	economical	to	construct,	the	statically	determinant	nature	of	the	trusses	in	the	bridge	requires	all	primary	load-carrying	members	to	maintain	their	integrity	for	the	bridge	to	remain	safe.		There	were	no	secondary	load	paths	to	accommodate	the	failure	of	a	single	gusset	plate.		A	non-redundant	bridge	can	also	be	described	as	a	non-robust	structure	[Olmati,	2013].		Robustness,	the	inverse	of	resilience,	is	a	structure’s	ability	to	endure	damage	while	maintaining	functionality	[Olmati,	2013].		Ideally,	a	resilience	analysis	would	help	stakeholders	better	identify	“weak	links”	in	their	systems,	like	the	Tex	Wash	and	I-35W	bridges,	and	potentially	allocate	resources	toward	improving	robustness	and/or	recovery.		Unfortunately,	these	designs	were	not	resilient	and	the	results	were	both	deadly	and	costly.			
2.2.3.3 	Quantifying	Resilience		
2.2.3.3.1 Bruneau	et	al.	[2003]	Bruneau	et	al.	[2003]	proposed	an	equation	to	quantify	resilience	as	a	function	of	the	quality	of	a	structure	and	recovery	time	(Equation	2-1).		The	quality	of	a	structure	is	a	measure	of	its	ability	to	perform	its	designed	task	where	loss	of	quality	is	given	as:	100-	
Q(t).		This	relates	resilience	to	a	structure’s	functionality	but	is	not	sensitive	to	specific	features	or	design	choices	in	a	particular	structure.	Figure	2-2	is	a	graphical	representation	of	the	quality	of	infrastructure	from	the	onset	of	an	event,	t0,	to	when	the	structure	regains	functionality	at	a	level	equal	to	before	the	event.	While	theoretically	sound,	implementation	
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of	Bruneau	et	al.’s	[2003]	framework	requires	the	designer	to	quantify	the	nebulous	“quality	of	infrastructure”	and	“rate	of	recovery”	after	an	event.	
 
Figure	2-2:	Quality	Function	[Bruneau	et	al.,	2003] 	 	
2.2.3.3.2 Deco	et	al.	[2013]	Deco	et	al.	[2013]	propose	a	similar	probabilistic	approach	to	bridge	design	using	resilience	and	rapidity	restoration	techniques.		Through	their	investigation,	Deco	et	al.	[2013]	quantify	specifically	seismic	resilience	through	assessment	preceding	a	seismic	event.		Deco	et	al.	[2013]	propose	Equation	2-2:			
𝑅 = 𝑄 𝑡 𝑑𝑡!!!!𝑡! − 𝑡!  
Equation	2-2	
Where,		 R=	resileince	 	Q(t)=	time-dependent	functionality	t0=	time	of	the	seismic	occurrence		
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th	is	the	total	time	the	bridge	is	under	investigation	Deco	et	al.	[2013]	provide	several	different	techniques	for	restoring	the	functionality	of	the	bridge	after	a	seismic	event.		The	results	of	their	study	found	the	most	effective	techniques	to	be	the	most	expensive	but	also	result	in	the	least	number	of	indirect	consequences	and,	subsequently,	the	highest	resilience	because	they	reduce	the	recovery	time.		Unfortunately,	since	this	research	focuses	on	seismic	events,	the	approach	is	not	applicable	to	any	extreme	event.	
2.2.3.3.3 Dong	and	Frangopol	[2016]	Dong	and	Frangopol	[2016]	quantify	the	functionality	of	a	bridge	over	time:	
𝑅!"#$ = 1∆𝑡! 𝑄 𝑡 𝑑𝑡!!!∆!!!!  
Equation	2-3 
Where:		 RResi=	resileince	
Δtr	=	the	amount	of	time	the	bridge	is	under	investigation	after	the	extreme	events		 t0=	the	time	of	investigation	Q(t)=	the	bridge’s	level	of	functionality	over	time	This	is	similar	to	the	studies	presented	above,	but	their	functionality	losses	are	due	to	the	combined	event	of	an	earthquake	on	a	bridge	that	has	experienced	severe	scour.		This	approach	is	more	practical	yet	very	specific	to	only	certain	cases.		The	approach	has	two	shortcomings:	it	does	not	apply	to	all	U.S.	bridges	and	the	analysis	is	retroactive,	occurring	only	after	a	bridge	is	damaged.	
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2.2.3.3.4 Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	develop	a	way	to	quantify	a	bridge’s	resilience,	specifically	as	it	is	impacted	by	climate	change.	The	researchers	propose	five	“bridge	resilience	indicators”	(BRI's)	to	quantify	a	bridge's	resilience:	1)	abutment	permafrost	stability;	2)	abutment	washout;	3)	pier	scour;	4)	abutment	erosion;	and	5)	deck	flooding.	The	BRIs	are	then	compared	to	their	capacity	measures,	which	are	a	way	to	“indicate	how	well	a	bridge	performs	under	climatic	changes”	[Ikpong	and	Bagchi,	2015].		The	corresponding	capacity	measures	are:	1)	hydraulic	capacity;	2)	pier	scour	protection;	3)	abutment	thermal	insulation;	and	4)	the	presence	of	a	pile	foundation.		The	capacity	measures	only	factor	in	climatic	events	due	to	climate	change.	For	example,	an	increase	in	temperature	would	cause	permafrost	to	thaw,	increase	snowmelt,	and	increase	flow	in	channels.			 Resilience	indicators	are	weighted	based	on	replacement	cost,	consequence	of	failure,	and	user	cost.		These	weighted	resilience	indicators	are	then	compared	to	the	applicable	capacity	measures.		In	other	words,	abutment	washout	is	compared	to	hydraulic	capacity,	pier	scour	is	compared	to	pier	scour	protection,	abutment	erosion	is	compared	to	abutment	thermal	insulation	or	the	presence	of	a	pile	foundation,	deck	flooding	is	compared	to	hydraulic	capacity,	and	abutment	permafrost	stability	is	compared	to	abutment	thermal	insulation	or	the	presence	of	a	pile	foundation.		Next,	a	BRI	score	is	calculated	based	on	the	weighted	indicators	and	comparative	capacity	measure.		Figure	2-3	provides	a	flowchart	of	the	proposed	calculation	of	resilience:	
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Figure	2-3:	BRI	Flowchart	[Ikpong	and	Bagchi,	2015]		 Calculation	of	a	BRI	happens	in	two	steps.		First,	a	weight	factor	(WF)	is	applied	to	account	for	the	relative	importance	of	the	bridge	and	its	effect	on	the	cost,	performance,	and	consequence	of	failure.		The	weight	factor	is	the	product	of	three	parameters,	as	seen	in	Equation	2-4,	and	has	a	minimum	value	of	3.38	and	a	maximum	value	of	125.		𝑊𝐹 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝛽 ∗ 𝜙	
	Equation	2-4	
	 Where:	α=	cost	of	the	component	of	the	bridge	that	is	directly	affected	by	the	climatic	event	β=	consequence	of	the	climatic	event	on	the	overall	performance	of	the	bridge	ϕ=	cost	to	the	user	in	terms	of	the	bridge's	serviceability	after	a	climatic	event	
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Resilience	indicators	are	weighted	by	these	weight	factors.		Replacement	cost	is	scored	by	a	percentage	of	the	replacement	cost	as	compared	to	the	cost	of	the	original	bridge	construction.		The	consequence	of	event	is	scored	by	the	severity	of	the	event	on	the	bridge’s	health,	i.e.	would	it	warrant	investigation	or	would	the	bridge	be	out	of	service.		User	cost	is	scored	by	the	impact	on	the	road	user	in	terms	of	reduced	number	of	lanes	or	detour	length.		A	sample	WF	calculation	is	presented	in	Table	2-1.		
Table	2-1:	BRI	Weight	Calculation	[Ikpong	and	Bagchi,	2015]	
 The	second	step	of	the	BRI	calculation	involved	comparing	each	resilience	indicator	to	its	capacity	measures.		Each	capacity	measure	rating	is	based	on	a	capacity	guide,	thereby	allowing	an	aspect	of	objectivity	to	the	score.		For	example,	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	use	a	2070’s	demand	for	their	capacity	measures,	which	included	a	projected	rise	in	sea	level	due	to	the	effects	of	climate	change.		Ikpong	and	Bagchi’s	[2015]	rating	scales	for	hydraulic	capacity,	pier	scour	resilience,	and	abutment	insulation	are	shown	in	Table	2-2.	
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Table	2-2:	Rating	Scale	for	Capacity	Measures	
Hydraulic	Capacity	 Pier	Scour	Resilience	 Abutment	Insulation	20:	>	1.85	m	 15:	Engineered	apron	 15:	Piling	and	blanket	18:	1.5-1.85	m	 12:	Adequate	riprap	 13:	Piling	only;	new	16:	1.2-1.5	m	 9:	Some	riprap	 11:	Pile	foundation	and	blanket	14:	1.0-	1.2	m	 6:	No	riprap,	slow	flow	 8:	Pile	foundation	only	0-14:	0-	1.0	m	 3:	No	riprap,	fast	flow	 6:	Wood	and	slow	creek	0:	<0	m	 0:	No	riprap,	threatened	 4:	Wood	and	fast	creek	-	 -:	N/A	 2:	Crumbling	wood				 After	the	weight	factors	and	the	resilience	indicators	are	determined,	the	BRI	is	calculated.		The	BRI	is	the	sum	of	the	product	of	the	weight	factors	and	the	resilience	indicators,	as	shown	in	Equation	2-5:	
𝐵𝑅𝐼 = 𝑊 𝑥! ∗ 𝑅(𝑥!)!!!!  
Equation	2-5 Where:	W=	weight	factor		R=	resilience	indicator	rating			 Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	performed	a	sensitivity	analysis	to	determine	the	effect	of	each	resilience	indicator	on	the	calculation	of	the	BRI.		Hydraulic	capacity	and	detour	availability	and	length	were	chosen	as	parameters	for	the	sensitivity	analysis.		The	researchers	demonstrated	that	the	BRI	score	is	sensitive	to	the	selection	of	freeboard	depth	as	the	BRI	decreased	with	an	increase	in	freeboard.		The	BRI	score	is	also	sensitive	to	the	selection	of	detour	length,	as	the	BRI	score	increased	with	a	reduction	in	detour	length.			 An	advantage	of	the	approach	proposed	by	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	is	it	is	easily	incorporated	into	current	practice	because	it	uses	information	collected	during	routine	
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inspections.		One	disadvantage	is	it	is	only	applicable	in	regions	that	have	permafrost.		Regions	in	warmer	climates,	such	as	Arizona,	are	not	subjected	to	melting	permafrost	from	increased	temperatures.	
2.2.4 	Current	Practice	
2.2.4.1 	LRFD	Design	Current	design	standards	utilize	an	approach	based	on	limit	state	philosophy,	which	is	applied	to	serviceability,	fatigue,	the	strength	of	the	structure,	and	extreme	events	[Alipour,	2013].		The	process	of	a	limit-based	design	involves	identifying	all	ways	a	structure	can	fail,	determining	a	level	of	safety	for	each	limit	state,	and	identifying	the	important	limit	states	for	each	individual	case	[MacGregor,	1976].		Of	these	criteria,	the	only	limit	state	that	has	been	calibrated	using	a	reliability-based	approach	is	the	strength	limit	state	[Alipour,	2013].		In	order	to	better	design	for	unpredictable	events,	performance	goals	should	be	based	on	the	applicable	limit	states,	not	the	event	itself	[Wen,	2001].		Reliability-based	design	involves	taking	the	variability	in	strength,	material,	loading,	and	size	of	individual	members	in	a	structure	and	their	limit	state,	ultimate	limit	state,	and	serviceability	limit	state.	This	has	mainly	come	in	the	form	of	a	load	and	resistance	factor	design	(LRFD)	approach.		Currently,	the	American	Association	of	State	and	Highway	Transportation	Officials	(AASHTO)	specify	the	use	of	LRFD	for	the	design	of	bridges.		In	LRFD,	criteria	for	design	are	based	on	probability	of	failure.		Current	practice	dictates	that	structures	are	designed	for	high	frequency,	high	probability	events.	
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2.2.4.2 	Performance-Based	Design	Estes	and	Frangopol	[2001]	propose	a	reliability-based	approach	for	identifying	bridges	in	need	of	repair.		They	analyzed	the	bridges	as	a	system,	rather	than	individual	parts,	in	order	to	determine	serviceability	and	performance.		This	approach	is	very	similar	to	modern	performance-based	design	(PBD)	approaches.		Ghosn	et	al.	[2016]	found	that	current	reliability-based	design	methods	had	large	variations	in	desired	reliability	levels	of	evaluating	the	strength	of	structures.		Ghosn	et	al.	[2016]	suggest	that	performance-based	design	may	be	the	best	next	step	in	design	standards	due	to	its	analysis	of	varying	failure	modes,	performance	levels,	and	structure	uses	as	well	as	the	analysis	of	risk.		It	is	clear	that	some	risk	analysis	performed	in	the	design	phase	of	a	structure	can	aid	in	the	structure’s	performance.			Performance-based	design	involves	designing	a	structure	to	meet	certain	performance	goals	throughout	the	design	life,	from	initial	design	to	service	and	maintenance	to	demolition	[Augusti	and	Ciampoli,	2008].		This	can	limit	the	ability	of	a	designer	to	control	the	results	of	a	performance-based	design	since	many	of	the	stages	of	life	are	out	of	their	control	[Augusti	and	Ciampoli,	2008].		However,	this	can	be	a	very	resourceful	and	customized	process	because	every	aspect	of	design	is	precisely	chosen	for	each	unique	project.	Since	a	PBD	approach	is	non-prescriptive,	creative	solutions	can	be	chosen	for	extreme	events	not	currently	standardized	in	design	codes	[Ghobarah,	et	al.	2001].		Currently,	PBD	is	most	commonly	used	in	seismic	design	[Zameeruddin	and	Sangle,	2016].		In	addition,	PBD	requires	a	contemporary	contractual	arrangement	because	the	process	involves	the	design	team,	owner,	and	contractors	from	the	onset	requiring	a	more	collaborative	approach.			
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2.2.4.3 	Bridge	Inspections	Federal	law	requires	routine	inspection	of	bridges	to	determine	their	overall	condition,	damage	in	need	of	repair,	and/or	needed	maintenance.		Typically,	a	visual	inspection	will	suffice.		Pictures	are	collected	of	the	overall	bridge,	approaches,	deck,	abutments,	piers,	superstructures,	substructure,	and	any	identified	maintenance	or	repair	items.		Very	little	quantitative	data	is	collected	other	than	measurements	of	the	vertical	clearance,	average	span,	and	overall	length.	Currently,	inspectors	perform	a	site	visit	to	a	bridge	for	a	visual	inspection.		Inspectors	gather	information	about	the	condition	of	bridge	components	through	a	qualitative	rating	system.		The	deck,	substructure,	superstructure,	and	any	applicable	channel,	channel	protection,	and	culverts	are	scored	with	a	condition	rating.		This	condition	rating	compares	the	current	state	of	the	structure	to	when	it	was	first	constructed	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration.,	1995].		Scores	are	based	on	the	condition	as	seen	visually	by	the	inspectors.		The	scores	also	indicate	whether	local	failures	are	possible	and	whether	the	bridge	should	be	closed	to	traffic	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].		Most	ratings	are	comparisons	to	previous	inspection	reports.		If	the	inspector	cannot	access	a	particular	section	of	a	bridge—	for	example,	a	footing	or	pile—	then	that	section	is	not	assessed	for	damage.	Results	are	reported	to	the	FHWA	and	stored	in	the	National	Bridge	Inventory	(NBI)	in	accordance	with	National	Bridge	Inspection	Standards	(NBIS).	An	important	metric	which	results	from	a	bridge	inspection	is	the	sufficiency	rating	(SR),	which	is	a	numerical	value	calculated	using	parameters	such	as	functionality,	serviceability,	detour	length,	average	daily	traffic,	and	structural	safety	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].	The	sufficiency	rating	equation	
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uses	information	from	the	Structure	Inventory	and	Appraisal	(SI&A)	report	and	is	shown	below	in	Equation	2-6:	 𝑆𝑅 = 𝑆1+ 𝑆2+ 𝑆3+ 𝑆4	
Equation	2-6	
	 Where:		 	 SR=	Sufficiency	rating		 	 S1=	55	–	(A+B),	0<S1<55		 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 A=	function	of	superstructure,	substructure,	and	culvert	rating		 	 	 	 B=	(32.4	–IR)	1.5	*	0.3254		 	 	 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 	 	 IR=	Inventory	rating		 	 S2=	30-	[J	+	(G	+	H)	+I],	0<	S2	<30	and	0<	(G	+	H)	<15		 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 J=	(A	+	B	+	C+	D	+	E	+	F),	0<J<13		 	 	 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 	 	 A=	function	of	deck	condition		 	 	 	 	 	 B=	function	of	structural	evaluation		 	 	 	 	 	 C=	function	of	deck	geometry		 	 	 	 	 	 D=	function	of	underclearances		 	 	 	 	 	 E=	function	of	waterway	adequacy		 	 	 	 	 	 F=	function	of	approach	road	alignment		
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G=	function	of	bridge	roadway	width,	approach	roadway	width,	and	structure	type		 	 	 	 H=	function	of	ADT,	bridge	roadway	width,	and	lanes	I=	function	of	vertical	clearance	and	Strategic	Highway	Network	(STRAHNET)	designation		 	 S3=	15	–	(A	+	B),	0<	S3	<15		 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 A=15 ∗ !"#∗!"#$%& !"#$%!!"#,!!!∗! ,	0<	A	<15		 	 	 	 	 Where:		 	 	 	 	 	 K=	!!!!!!" 		 	 	 	 B=	function	of	STRAHNET	designation		 If	the	inspector	discovers	any	major	issues	requiring	repair,	then	a	report	is	compiled	detailing	what	the	issue	is,	where	it	is	located	on	the	bridge,	and	its	repair	priority	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].		The	sufficiency	rating	is	also	used	to	determine	whether	a	bridge	merits	further	investigation.		If	an	issue	were	detected	from	the	sufficiency	rating,	maintenance	or	repairs	would	be	triggered.		A	drawback	of	this	approach	is	it	is	reactive	as	opposed	to	proactive.	Repairs	and	maintenance	are	not	performed	until	inspectors	discover	an	issue.		There	are	no	proactive	measures	taken	to	prevent	such	issues	from	occurring	in	the	first	place.	
2.2.5 	Current	Needs	Resilience	is	an	integral	component	of	a	bridge’s	performance	and	should	be	incorporated	into	its	design,	construction,	and	maintenance.		There	is	a	need	to	adapt	
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resiliency	concepts	into	the	management	of	infrastructure.		As	technologies,	abilities,	and	techniques	improve,	new	bridges	may	not	fit	into	the	“normal”	criteria	that	form	the	basis	of	current	design	codes.		In	addition,	in	light	of	the	increasing	frequency	of	intense	and/or	unforeseen	loading	events,	we	will	need	our	structures	to	be	better	equipped	to	adapt.		New	design	strategies	that	address	resilience	may	be	the	next	step	to	design	the	bridges	of	the	future	[Casas,	2015].	In	order	to	include	resilience	in	design,	there	is	a	need	for	a	measured	and	objective	assessment.		A	quantitative	value	for	resilience	will	provide	an	easily	interpretable	measurement	for	a	bridge’s	ability	to	recover	from	loss	of	functionality.		In	addition,	this	value	can	further	the	advancement	of	PBD	approaches	for	bridges.			Along	with	a	quantitative	measure,	there	is	a	need	for	“shovel-ready”	guidelines	for	incorporating	resilience	into	the	structural	design,	analysis,	and	inspection	of	bridges.		Through	adoption	of	resilience	policies,	we	may	be	able	to	preemptively	limit	or	prevent	the	economic	or	life	losses	of	future	catastrophes.	
2.2.6 	Goals	In	light	of	the	above	needs,	the	goal	of	this	research	aims	to	incorporate	a	resilience	measure	into	the	design	of	new	bridges	and	the	assessment	of	existing	bridges.		This	will	be	accomplished	by	first	identifying	the	factors	that	will	be	used	to	inform	the	resilience	measure	and	identifying	a	process	for	using	these	factors.		Then,	a	number	of	case	study	bridges	will	be	selected.		A	purposeful	sampling	includes	new	and	old	bridges,	as	well	as	bridges	with	high	and	low	sufficiency	ratings.		Condition	assessments	will	be	performed,	and	sufficiency	ratings	and	load	ratings	calculated.		Based	on	preliminary	assessments	of	the	case	study	bridges,	a	bridge	resilience	rating	system	will	be	derived	and	refined.	Finally,	
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the	resilience	of	the	bridges	of	this	study	will	be	rated.		The	results	of	the	ratings	between	bridges	will	be	compared	and	the	implications	discussed.
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3 Methods	
3.1 Overview	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	explain	the	methodology	for	the	assessment	of	an	existing	bridge’s	resilience.		Initially,	all	bridges	in	Arizona	are	surveyed	and	four	are	selected	for	a	comparative	case	study.		To	rate	their	resilience,	information	on	these	bridges,	such	as	the	as-built	construction	drawings	and	the	Structure	Inventory	and	Appraisal	(SI&A)	Report	are	obtained	through	the	Arizona	Department	of	Transportation	(ADOT).			
3.2 Collection	of	Existing	Data	
3.2.1 	ADOT	Bridge	Database	The	ADOT	bridge	database	contains	information	on	all	of	the	bridges	in	Arizona	that	are	owned	and	managed	by	the	state	of	Arizona.		The	information	contained	in	this	database	includes	the	structure	number,	route	number,	route	milepost,	bridge	name,	district,	year	built,	kind	of	material,	type	of	design/construction,	number	of	spans,	span	length,	structure	length,	inventory	rating,	operating	rating,	and	sufficiency	rating,	among	others.		This	information	is	used	to	identify	and	select	four	case	study	bridges,	as	detailed	in	Section	3.5.			
3.2.2 	As-Built	Construction	Documents	After	selection	of	the	four	case	study	bridges,	as-built	documents	were	obtained	from	ADOT.		These	documents	include	information	about	the	bridge’s	location,	site	characteristics,	material	properties,	and	design	loading.		They	also	provide	construction	
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details	of	the	embankment,	foundation,	substructure,	and	superstructure.		This	information	was	used	to	perform	resilience	calculations	as	detailed	in	Sections	3.4.2	through	3.4.3.	
3.2.3 	Inspection	Documents	
3.2.3.1 	Contents	 	Inspection	documents	for	each	bridge	were	obtained	from	ADOT.		These	documents	include	a	Structure	Inventory	and	Appraisal	(SI&A)	report,	inspection	report,	inspection	photographs,	channel	diagram,	and	any	applicable	repair	reports,	maintenance	reports,	or	fracture	critical	member	in-depth	inspection	reports.	
3.2.3.2 	Structure	Inventory	and	Appraisal	(SI&A)	Report		The	SI&A	report	contains	information	on	functionality,	integrity,	and	essentiality	for	public	use.		Functionality	refers	to	a	bridge’s	ability	to	accommodate	current	traffic	conditions	as	a	function	of	ADT	and	the	bridge’s	geometry.		Integrity	refers	to	a	bridge’s	structural	safety	and	is	a	function	of	the	condition	rating	of	the	substructure	and	superstructure,	and	inventory	rating.		Essentiality	for	public	use	is	a	function	of	detour	length	and	ADT.		The	SI&A	report	culminates	in	the	sufficiency	rating	(SR),	which	is	a	measure	of	how	“sufficient”	(i.e.	functional,	structurally	sound,	and	essential)	a	bridge	is	for	its	current	use.		The	SR	value	is	used	by	the	FHWA	to	justify	the	allocation	of	repair	or	replacement	funding.		For	example,	if	a	bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	below	80,	it	is	eligible	to	receive	funding	for	repairs	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	2012].		If	a	bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	50	or	less,	it	is	eligible	to	receive	funding	for	replacement	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	
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Administration,	2012].		The	SI&A	report	can	also	classify	a	bridge	as	structurally	deficient,	functionally	obsolete,	or	fracture	critical.	A	goal	of	this	project	is	to	rate	a	structure’s	resilience	using	information	contained	in	the	SI&A	report	because	it	is	readily	available.		A	reason	for	this	is	to	ensure	easy	adaptation	by	bridge	management	groups.	
3.2.3.3 	Inspection	Report	The	inspection	report	contains	detailed	information	about	the	condition	of	the	bridge.		The	report	contains	the	National	Bridge	Inventory	(NBI)	condition	ratings	from	the	SI&A	report	and	provides	in-depth	explanations	for	why	the	deck,	superstructure,	substructure,	and	channel	receive	their	ratings.		The	deck,	superstructure,	and	substructure	are	rated	on	a	scale	from	0-9	as	seen	in	Table	3-1.	
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Table	3-1:	Condition	Ratings	for	Deck,	Superstructure,	and	Substructure	[US	Department	of	
Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995]	Code	 Description	N	 Not	applicable	9	 Excellent	condition	8	 Very	good	condition-	no	problems	noted.	7	 Good	condition-	some	minor	problems.	6	 Satisfactory	condition-	structural	elements	show	some	minor	deterioration.	5	 Fair	condition-	all	primary	structural	elements	are	sound	but	may	have	minor	section	loss,	cracking,	spalling,	or	scour.	4	 Poor	condition-	advanced	section	loss,	deterioration,	spalling,	or	scour.	
3	 Serious	condition-	loss	of	section,	deterioration,	spalling,	or	scour	have	seriously	affected	primary	structural	components.		Local	failures	are	possible.	Fatigue	cracks	in	steel	or	shear	cracks	in	concrete	may	be	present.	
2	 Critical	condition-	advanced	deterioration	of	primary	structural	elements.		Fatigue	cracks	in	steel	or	shear	cracks	in	concrete	may	be	present	or	scour	may	have	removed	substructure	support.		Unless	closely	monitored,	it	may	be	necessary	to	close	the	bridge	until	corrective	action	is	taken.	1	 “Imminent”	failure	condition-	major	deterioration	or	section	loss	present	in	critical	structural	components	or	obvious	vertical	or	horizontal	movement	affecting	structure	stability.		Bridge	is	closed	to	traffic	but	corrective	action	may	put	back	in	light	service.	0	 Failed	condition-	out	of	service-	beyond	corrective	action		The	channel	and	channel	protection	is	similarly	rated	on	a	scale	as	seen	in	Table	3-2.	
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Table	3-2	Condition	Rating	for	Channel	and	Channel	Protection	[US	Department	of	
Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995]	Code	 Description	N	 Not	applicable.	Used	when	bridge	not	over	waterway	9	 There	are	no	noticeable	or	noteworthy	deficiencies	which	affect	the	condition	of	the	channel	8	 Banks	are	protected	or	well	vegetated.		River	control	device	such	as	spur	dikes	and	embankment	protection	are	not	required	or	are	in	a	stable	condition	7	 Bank	protection	is	in	need	of	minor	repairs.		River	control	devices	and	embankment	protection	have	a	little	minor	damage.		Banks	and/or	channel	have	minor	amounts	of	drift	6	 Bank	is	beginning	to	slump.		River	control	devices	and	embankment	protection	have	widespread	minor	damage.		There	is	minor	stream	bed	movement	evident.	Debris	is	restricting	the	channel	slightly	5	 Bank	protection	is	being	eroded.		River	control	devices	and/or	embankment	have	major	damage.		Trees	and	brush	restrict	the	channel	4	 Bank	and	embankment	protection	is	severely	undermined.		River	control	devices	have	severe	damage.		Large	deposits	of	debris	are	in	the	channel	3	 Bank	protection	has	failed.		River	control	devices	have	been	destroyed.		Stream	bed	aggradation,	degradation	or	lateral	movement	has	changed	the	channel	to	now	threaten	the	bridge	and/or	approach	roadway	2	 Bridge	is	near	state	of	collapse	because	of	changed	in	the	channel		1	 Bridge	closed	because	of	channel	failure.		Corrective	action	may	put	back	in	light	service	0	 Bridge	closed	because	of	channel	failure.		Replacement	necessary.		The	inspection	report	also	includes	the	appraisal	ratings	from	the	SI&A	report	for	the	structural	evaluation,	deck	geometry,	vertical	and	horizontal	clearances,	waterway	adequacy,	approach	roadway	alignment,	and	scour	critical	designation.			These	items	are	also	rated	on	a	scale	from	0	to	9,	as	seen	in	Table	3-3.	Finally,	a	detailed	explanation	on	the	status	of	any	maintenance	or	repairs	is	also	reported	in	the	inspection	report.		
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Table	3-3:	Condition	Rating	for	Structural	Evaluation,	Deck	Geometry,	Vertical	and	
Horizontal	Clearances,	Waterway	Adequacy,	and	Approach	Roadway	Alignment	[US	
Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995]	Code	 Description	N	 Not	applicable	9	 Superior	to	present	desirable	criteria	8	 Equal	to	present	desirable	criteria	7	 Better	than	present	minimum	criteria	6	 Equal	to	present	minimum	criteria	5	 Somewhat	better	than	minimum	adequacy	to	tolerate	being	left	in	place	as	is	4	 Meets	minimum	tolerable	limits	to	be	left	in	place	as	is	3	 Basically	intolerable	requiring	high	priority	of	corrective	action	2	 Basically	intolerable	requiring	high	priority	of	replacement	1	 This	value	of	rating	code	not	used	0	 Bridge	closed		 Scour	critical	bridges	is	rated	on	a	scale	from	0	to	9,	as	seen	in	Table	3-4.	
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Table	3-4:	Rating	Scale	for	Scour	Critical	Bridges	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	
Highway	Administration,	1995]	Code	 Description	N	 Bridge	not	over	waterway	
U	 Bridge	with	“unknown”	foundation	that	has	not	been	evaluated	for	scour.		Since	risk	cannot	be	determined,	flag	for	monitoring	during	flood	events	and,	if	appropriate,	closure	
T	 Bridge	is	over	“tidal”	waters	that	has	not	been	evaluated	for	scour,	but	considered	low	risk.		Bridge	will	be	monitored	with	regular	inspection	cycle	and	with	appropriate	underwater	inspections	9	 Bridge	foundations	(including	piles)	on	dry	land	well	above	flood	water	elevations	8	 Bridge	foundations	determined	to	be	stable	for	assessed	or	calculated	scour	conditions.		Calculated	scour	is	above	top	of	footing	7	 Countermeasures	have	been	installed	to	correct	a	previously	existing	problem	with	scour.		Bridge	is	no	longer	scour	critical	6	 Scour	calculation/evaluation	has	not	been	made	5	 Bridge	foundations	determined	to	be	stable	for	calculated	scour	conditions.		Scour	within	limits	of	footing	or	piles.	4	 Bridge	foundations	determined	to	be	stable	for	calculated	scour	conditions.		Field	review	indicates	action	is	required	to	protect	exposed	foundations	from	effects	of	additions	erosion	and	corrosion	3	 Bridge	is	scour	critical.		Bridge	foundations	determined	to	be	unstable	for	calculated	scour	conditions:	1)	scour	within	limits	of	footing	or	piles,	2)	scour	below	spread-footing	base	or	pile	tips	2	 Bridge	is	scour	critical.		Field	review	indicates	that	extensive	scour	has	occurred	at	bridge	foundations.		Immediate	action	is	required	to	provide	scour	countermeasures	1	 Bridge	is	scour	critical.		Field	review	indicates	that	failure	of	piers/abutments	is	imminent.		Bridge	closed	to	traffic	0	 Bridge	is	scour	critical.		Bridge	has	failed	and	is	closed	to	traffic		
3.2.3.4 	Bridge	Inspection	Photographs		Inspection	reports	are	accompanied	with	a	“photo	report”,	which	contains	photographs	the	inspectors	collected	during	inspection.		Typical	photographs	in	this	report	include	the	roadway	identification,	bridge	elevation	view,	deck	condition,	joint	conditions,	and	any	significant	damage.	
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3.2.3.5 	Channel	Diagram		The	channel	diagram	is	a	sketch	of	the	elevation	of	the	bridge	and	waterway.		This	sketch	shows	the	transverse	characteristics	of	the	channel	and	substructure,	such	as	slope	and	elevation,	number	of	piers,	span	lengths,	and	overall	bridge	length.	
3.2.3.6 	Repair	Report	The	repair	report	contains	information	on	needed	repairs.		Damaged	items	that	contribute	to	the	structural	integrity	of	the	bridge	are	the	only	items	considered	for	repair.		For	example,	deck	deterioration,	cracks	in	girders	or	abutments,	and	bearings	in	need	of	replacement	are	considered	repair	items.		The	repair	report	also	includes	detailed	information	about	the	extent	and	cost	of	the	repairs,	and	a	timeframe	on	when	the	repairs	are	to	be	completed.			
3.2.3.7 	Maintenance	Report	The	maintenance	report	lists	needed	maintenance	items,	which	are	different	from	repair	items	in	that	maintenance	items	are	not	concerned	with	the	integrity	of	the	bridge.		For	example,	damaged	guardrails,	excessive	debris,	or	cracks	in	the	wearing	surface	are	considered	maintenance	items.		The	maintenance	report	provides	an	estimate	of	the	total	cost	of	maintenance	as	well	as	priority	scheduling	requirements.	
3.2.3.8 	Fracture	Critical	Member	In-Depth	Inspection	An	in-depth	inspection	is	required	for	bridges	that	are	designated	as	“fracture	critical”.		A	fracture	critical	bridge	is	a	structure	that	could	totally	collapse	upon	the	loss	of	a	single	component.		The	in-depth	reports	contain	information	about	which	members	are	
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fracture	critical	and	their	condition.		Photographs	are	taken	of	these	members	along	with	a	sketch	or	drawing	of	their	location	on	the	structure.	
3.3 	Characteristics	Related	to	Resilience	
3.3.1 	Sufficiency	Rating	A	bridge’s	sufficiency	rating	is	listed	in	the	SI&A	report	and	contains	information	on	functionality,	structural	integrity,	and	essentiality	or	usefulness	to	the	public.		The	sufficiency	rating	is	scaled	from	0	to	100.		Bridges	with	higher	scores	are	typically	considered	“more	sufficient”	bridges.		A	major	drawback	of	a	sufficiency	rating	is	it	is	not	indicative	of	a	structure’s	resilience.			While	not	a	measure	of	resilience,	a	component	of	a	structure’s	sufficiency,	“user	cost”,	is	also	a	component	of	its	resilience.	The	determination	of	user	cost,	S3,	is	listed	in	Equation	3-1	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995]:	𝑆3 = 15− (𝐴 + 𝐵) 	
Equation	3-1	
Where:		 A=	15 !"# ∗ !")!"#,!!!∗! 		 	 k=	!!!!!!" 		 	 	 S1=	a	function	of	the	condition	ratings	for			 	 	 S2=	a	function	of	ADT	and	bridge	geometry		 	 ADT=	average	daily	traffic		 	 DL=	detour	length	(miles)		 B=	2	if	Item	100	>	0	
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	 B=	0	if	Item	100	=0		 	 Item	100=	STRAHNET	highway	designation	User	cost	rating	is	easy	to	implement	into	a	resilience	rating	because	it	is	part	of	the	inspection	report.	
3.3.2 	Scour	Critical	Designation	A	scour	critical	designation	is	listed	in	the	SI&A	report,	where	a	score	of	4	or	less	is	a	scour	critical	rating.		In	addition,	for	a	bridge	to	be	classified	as	scour	critical,	it	also	must	have	the	characteristic	of	unstable	piers	or	abutments	due	to	either	existing	scour	depth	or	the	potential	for	scour	as	determined	by	an	in-depth	scour	evaluation	study	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].		Scour	critical	bridges	with	existing	scour	damage	are	routinely	monitored	to	determine	if	repairs	are	needed,	based	on	the	results	and	recommendations	from	the	in-depth	scour	study.		Scour	is	also	a	sufficiency	parameter	related	to	resilience	because	of	its	relationship	to	the	intensity	of	a	weather	event.			
3.3.3 	Scour	Protection	To	quantify	resilience,	it	is	necessary	to	characterize	the	level	of	a	bridge’s	scour	protection.		In	the	SI&A	report,	the	type	of	scour	protection	is	listed	for	both	the	abutments	and	the	piers.		The	protection	type	is	recorded	on	a	scale,	with	the	highest	numbers	designating	the	highest	level	of	protection	and	lower	numbers	designating	a	lower	level	of	scour	protection.			
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3.3.4 	Detour	Length	and	Average	Daily	Traffic	(ADT)	The	combination	of	both	the	detour	length	and	average	daily	traffic	is	a	measure	of	how	essential	the	route	is	for	a	community	and	the	cost	to	the	users.		A	bridge	with	a	small	detour	length	but	large	ADT	may	have	a	similar	user	cost	to	a	bridge	with	a	large	detour	length	but	small	ADT.		These	parameters	are	included	in	the	SI&A	report	and	are	used	in	Equation	3-1	to	calculate	a	bridge’s	essentiality	for	public	use.	
3.3.5 	Fracture	Critical	Designation	A	bridge	is	classified	as	fracture	critical	if	the	loss	of	one	member	or	component	can	cause	the	entire	structure	to	fail.		The	fracture	critical	designation	of	a	structure	is	related	to	its	resilience	(or	lack	of)	because	a	structure	that	is	fracture	critical	does	not	have	redundancy.		In	other	words,	if	a	bridge	can	fail	with	the	loss	of	one	member,	it	is	a	non-redundant	structure	and	therefore	non-resilient	because	it	does	not	have	the	ability	to	recover.			
3.3.6 	Inventory	and	Operational	Rating	The	inventory	and	operational	rating	designates	the	largest	truck	that	can	be	driven	over	the	bridge	without	exceeding	the	design	capacity	of	its	components.		Currently,	bridges	are	commonly	designed	for	an	AASHTO	LRFD	HL-93	loading,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	3-1:	
45		
		
Figure	3-1:	HL-93	Truck	Loading	The	two	32	kip	point	loads	represent	the	two	trailer	axles	of	a	truck	and	are	separated	by	a	distance	of	14	to	30	feet.	The	8	kip	point	load	represents	the	axle	for	the	cab	of	the	truck	and	is	located	14	feet	away	from	the	32	kip	load.		A	lane	loading	of	0.64	kips	per	foot	is	included	to	account	for	the	dynamic	effect	of	the	moving	vehicles.		If	a	bridge	cannot	resist	the	loads	produced	by	an	HL-93	truck,	Arizona	state	regulations	require	the	maximum	loading	of	the	bridge	be	posted	along	the	route.	
3.3.7 	Foundation	Type	A	bridge’s	foundation	type	is	related	to	its	resilience	because	it	determines	how	a	substructure	withstands	flows	that	could	potentially	wash	them	out.		The	foundation	type	is	categorized	as	spread	footings,	piles,	or	drilled	shaft	foundations.	
3.3.8 	Supports	A	bridge’s	supports	are	related	to	its	resilience	because	they	influence	how	a	bridge	responds	to	thermal	deformations	caused	by	temperature	differentials.		As	such	support	types	are	categorized	based	on	their	ability	to	alleviate	thermal	deformations.	
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3.3.9 	Capacity	and	Demand	Typically,	engineers	proportion	the	structural	elements	of	a	bridge	to	fail	by	a	flexural	mechanism.		Flexural	failures	are	more	ductile	and	show	warning	signs	of	yielding	before	complete	loss	of	equilibrium.		Ductile	failure	modes	are	easier	to	predict,	as	indicated	by	their	strength	reduction	factors.		For	example,	flexure	has	a	much	higher	strength	reduction	factor	of	0.90	compared	to	shear	at	0.75.		Strength	reduction	factors	are	calibrated	so	a	more	ductile	mechanism	is	the	controlling	failure	mode.		If	the	ductile	and	brittle	failure	modes	are	close	to	their	respective	capacities,	the	member	has	a	higher	probability	of	a	brittle	failure.		A	bridge	that	would	fail	suddenly	in	shear	results	in	a	low	resilience	due	to	the	lack	of	warning	signs	and	higher	probability	of	failure.			
3.4 	Proposed	Resilience	Rating	Method	This	section	outlines	the	proposed	methodology	for	rating	the	resilience	of	a	bridge.		This	approach	is	adapted	from	the	method	proposed	by	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	(see	Section	2.2.3.3.4).		The	resilience	of	a	bridge	can	be	rated	as	given	in	Equation	3-2:	
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊(𝑥!) ∗ 𝑅(𝑥!)!!!! 	
Equation	3-2	
	 Where:		 	 RR=	resilience	rating		 	 W(xi)=	weight	factor	for	each	resilience	indicator		 	 R(xi)=	rating	of	each	resilience	indicator	against	its	capacity	measure		 	 n=	number	of	resilience	indicators		
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	 The	interaction	between	weight	factors,	resilience	indicator	ratings,	and	capacity	measures	is	illustrated	in	Figure	3-2:	
	
Figure	3-2:	Resilience	Rating	Flowchart	
3.4.1 	Weight	Factors		In	addition	to	the	capacity	measure	ratings,	the	resilience	indicators	are	weighted	based	on	the	structural	integrity,	functionality	and	essentiality	of	the	bridge.			A	weight	factor	is	calculated	to	determine	the	relative	importance	of	each	resilience	indicator	relative	to	the	other	indicators.		The	three	proposed	weight	factors	are	adapted	from	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	as	follows:		1)	Replacement	cost	(α)	2)	Consequence	of	event	(β)	3)	User	cost	(φ)	The	composite	weight	for	each	resilience	indicator	is	determined	using	Equation	3-3:	
𝑊 𝑥 = 𝑊𝐹𝑊𝐹!!!! 	
Equation	3-7	
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	 	 Where:		 	 	 W(x)=	composite	weight	for	a	given	resilience	indicator		 	 	 WF=	weight	factor,	α×β×φ		 	 	 n=	number	of	resilience	indicators		The	weights	provide	a	relative	comparison	between	resilience	indicators	and	are	described	in	detail	in	Sections	3.4.1.1	through	3.4.1.3.	
3.4.1.1 	Replacement	Cost,	α	The	replacement	cost	weight	factor	is	the	cost	of	a	component	of	the	bridge	affected	by	the	applicable	resilience	indicator.		In	other	words,	the	replacement	cost	is	the	monetary	cost	to	repair	or	replace	that	component	for	the	bridge	to	regain	functionality.		The	weight	factor	is	based	on	the	ratio	of	the	cost	to	replace	the	single	component	over	the	cost	of	the	construction	of	the	entire	bridge.		Since	total	construction	costs	are	reported	for	the	year	they	were	built	and	do	not	take	into	account	inflation,	this	ratio	can	be	simplified	into	a	ratio	of	the	size	of	the	component	over	the	size	of	the	entire	bridge.		The	weight	factors	are	adapted	from	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	through	the	authors’	“several	years	of	experience”	with	bridge	inventory	management	(Table	3-5).		
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Table	3-5:	Replacement	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Weight	Factor	 Replacement	Cost,	α	5	 20-25%	4	 15-20%	3	 10-15%	2	 5-10%	1.5	 0-5%	0	 N/A	
3.4.1.2 	Consequence	of	Event,	β		 The	consequence	of	event	weight	factor	refers	to	the	state	of	the	bridge’s	structural	integrity	and	functionality	if	it	were	to	sustain	damage	from	the	applicable	resilience	indicator.		These	ratings	are	also	adapted	from	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015]	as	given	in	Table	3-6.	
Table	3-6:	Consequence	of	Event	Weight	Factor	
Weight	Factor		 Consequence	of	Event,	β	5	 Out	of	service	3	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	2	 Triggers	deterioration	1.5	 Warrants	testing	or	investigation	-	 N/A		
3.4.1.3 	User	Cost,	φ		 The	user	cost	weight	factor	is	determined	by	considering	the	cost	of	the	bridge	to	the	user	if	it	were	to	sustain	damage.		This	factor	is	based	on	detour	length	and	average	daily	traffic	(ADT).			“Essentiality	for	Public	Use”,	S3,	is	used	to	quantify	user	cost.		This	metric	uses	information	given	in	the	SI&A	report,	including	detour	length,	ADT,	and	
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STRAHNET	highway	designation.		However,	this	user	cost	rating	applies	to	the	entire	bridge	and	does	not	change	with	varying	components.		Therefore,	the	S3	rating	is	used	in	conjunction	with	the	direct	user	impact	cost	rating	scale	from	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015].		The	highest	rating	between	S3	for	the	entire	bridge	and	the	direct	user	impact	rating	is	used.		The	weight	factors	are	listed	in	Table	3-7	and	are	adapted	from	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015].	
Table	3-7:	User	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Weight	Factor	 User	Cost,	φ	5	 0<	S3	≤	3	Out	of	service	and/or	no	detour	3	 3<	S3	≤	6	Temporary	closure	and	detour	over	98	miles	2.5	 6	<	S3	≤	9	Temporary	closure	and	detour	50-98	miles	2	 9<	S3	≤12	Temporary	closure	and	detour	0-50	miles	1.5	 12	<	S3	≤	15	Delays/number	of	lanes	reduced	0	 N/A	
3.4.2 	Resilience	Indicators	
3.4.2.1 	Proposed	Indicators	The	proposed	approach	weights	and	ranks	five	indicators	of	structural	resilience	and	calculates	a	total	resilience	rating.		Resilience	“indicators”	are	synonymous	with	an	unforeseen	event	(can	also	be	thought	of	as	the	“demands”	on	resilience)	and	are	compared	with	applicable	capacity	measures.		Each	resilience	indicator	is	mapped	and	ranked	against	a	respective	capacity	measure.		As	such,	the	five	proposed	resilience	indicators	and	respective	capacity	measures	are	shown	in	Figure	3-3.		These	indicators	and	capacity	measures	are	explained	in	detail	in	subsequent	sections.	
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Figure	3-3:	Resilience	Indicators	and	Capacity	Measures	
3.4.2.2 	Pier/Abutment	Washout	Extreme	precipitation	events	can	cause	flash	flooding.		Across	Arizona,	the	summer	monsoon	season	brings	more	precipitation	than	is	seen	the	rest	of	the	year.		Commonly,	precipitation	events	during	monsoon	season	in	Arizona	have	large	amounts	of	rainfall	over	a	short	period	of	time.		Changes	in	climate	are	making	these	events	more	intense	and	more	frequent	[Castro	et	al.,	2014].		These	new	demands	potentially	cause	unpredictable	demand	to	piers	and	abutments	relative	to	historical	precedent.		For	example,	as	seen	in	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	(Section	2.2.3.2),	intense	flash	flooding	can	washout	the	entire	structure	and	cause	a	total	collapse.		A	more	resilient	foundation	would	resist	such	excessive	amounts	of	soil	loss.		For	the	proposed	method	detailed	in	this	chapter,	the	resilience	indicator	of	pier	
or	abutment	washout	is	ranked	against	the	foundation	type	capacity	measure.	
3.4.2.3 	Extreme	Temperature	Extreme	temperatures	can	also	affect	the	structural	integrity	of	a	bridge.		With	current	changes	in	weather	patterns,	bridges	are	experiencing	more	extreme	variations	in	temperature.		Higher	temperature	variations	can	cause	excessive	longitudinal	expansion,	thereby	placing	higher	demand	on	the	support	bearings	and	expansion	joints.		Thus,	for	the	
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method	proposed	in	this	chapter,	the	resilience	indicator	of	extreme	temperature	is	ranked	against	the	support	type.			
3.4.2.4 	Load	Path		A	structure’s	load	path	is	a	critical	component	of	its	resilience	because	alternative	load	paths	allow	for	load	redistribution	in	the	event	of	a	local	failure.		By	providing	alternative	load	paths,	a	bridge	can	remain	functional	even	if	a	member	fails.		In	contrast,	non-redundant	structures	are	not	resilient	because	a	single	member	failure	can	cause	the	entire	structure	to	collapse.		For	the	method	proposed	in	this	chapter,	the	resilience	indicator	of	load	path	is	ranked	with	the	bridge’s	redundancy.			
3.4.2.5 	Failure	Mode	Typically,	bridges	are	designed	so	that	a	weakening	or	failing	member	gives	warning	or	indication	of	yielding	before	failure.		In	design,	this	is	typically	accomplished	through	the	calibration	of	strength	reduction	factors.		This	calibration	compels	a	bridge’s	capacity	to	be	controlled	by	a	ductile	failure	mode.		In	contrast,	if	a	bridge	were	controlled	by	a	brittle	failure	mode,	there	would	be	little	to	no	indication	of	yielding.		As	a	result,	if	the	chance	of	a	brittle	failure	mode	occurring	were	such	that	it	happened	before	a	ductile	failure	mode,	then	an	intense	or	unpredictable	loading	event	could	result	in	a	sudden,	unexpected	failure.		For	the	proposed	method	described	in	this	chapter,	the	failure	mode	resilience	indicator	is	ranked	against	the	strength	reduction	factors.			
3.4.2.6 	Soil	Erosion	Similar	to	abutment	and	pier	washout,	soil	erosion	can	result	from	intense	flooding	or	flows.		Erosion	of	the	soil	surrounding	the	foundation	could	result	in	a	stability	failure	
53		
(e.g.	overturning,	sliding,	bearing,	etc.).	Bridges	typically	have	scour	protection	measures	installed	in	the	channel	to	prevent	excessive	soil	erosion.		Thus,	the	type	and	amount	of	scour	protection	can	make	the	bridge	more	or	less	resilient.		For	the	proposed	method	detailed	in	this	chapter,	the	soil	erosion	resilience	indicator	is	ranked	against	the	scour	
protection.			
3.4.3 	Capacity	Measures	
3.4.3.1 	Resilience	Indicators	versus	Capacity	Measures	As	previously	mentioned,	capacity	measures	are	synonymous	with	the	protection	of	the	bridge	to	withstand	an	unforeseen	event	and	resilience	indicators	categorize	these	events.		Capacity	measures	are	ranked	with	scores	between	0	and	15.		These	values	are	adapted	from	the	recommendations	of	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015].		According	to	Ikpong	and	Bagchi	[2015],	the	values	were	determined	from	a	combination	of	expert	interviews	and	procedures	found	in	Sinha	et	al.	[2009],	Patidar	et	al.	[2007],	and	Thompson	et	al.	[2008].	
3.4.3.2 	Foundation	Type	The	foundation	type	capacity	measure	is	used	to	rate	the	resilience	of	the	pier	or	abutment	against	washout.		The	ratings	and	capacity	measures,	as	seen	in	Table	3-8,	are	based	on	foundation	type	given	in	the	SI&A	report.	
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Table	3-8:	Foundation	Type	Rating	
Rating	 Foundation	Type		15	 9.	Drilled	shaft	or	caisson	13	 8.	Timber	piles	11	 7.	Precast	concrete	piles	8	 4	to	6.	CIP	fluted	shell,	CIP	pipe	shell,	Steel	H	piles	6	 3.	Spread	on	bedrock	4	 2.		Spread	on	cemented	soil	2	 1.	Spread	on	uncemented	soil		 	Bridge	foundation	types	are	listed	in	the	SI&A	report	with	two	numbers.		The	first	number	identifies	the	type	of	foundation	for	the	abutments	and	the	second	number	identifies	the	type	of	foundation	for	any	applicable	pier(s).		For	the	proposed	resilience	rating	method,	the	lower	of	the	two	numbers	is	used	to	rate	the	foundation	type.	
3.4.3.3 	Support	Type	The	support	type	capacity	measure	is	used	to	rate	the	resilience	of	the	superstructure	against	extreme	temperature	variations.		The	two	categories	of	supports	considered	are	expansion	joints	and	integral	supports.		Expansion	joints	allow	for	thermal	movement	due	to	an	increase	in	temperature.		This	is	beneficial	because	it	allows	the	superstructure	to	expand	without	inducing	stress.		However,	a	disadvantage	to	expansion	joints	is	they	are	more	susceptible	to	corrosion	and	degradation,	thereby	requiring	added	maintenance.		The	required	width	of	the	expansion	joint	is	a	function	of	span	length,	change	in	temperature	and	the	coefficient	of	thermal	expansion.		For	this	study,	an	extreme	temperature	differential	between	maximum	lows	and	highs	is	125°	F.		This	value,	found	in	the	AASHTO	LRFD	Design	Specifications	section	3.12,	comes	from	the	most	extreme	
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temperature	differential	in	Arizona,	regardless	of	material	or	climate.		The	width	of	expansion	joint	required	for	this	temperature	difference	is	compared	to	the	expansion	joint	as	constructed.		In	this	way,	the	capacity	of	the	expansion	joint	is	measured	against	an	extreme	change	in	temperature.		The	required	expansion	joint	width	calculated	per	Equation	3-4.	 𝛿!"#!!"# = 𝛼 ∗ ∆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿	
Equation	3-4	
	 Where:		 δtemp125=	thermal	deformation	for	125°	F	temperature	difference	(in.)		 	 α=	6.0×10-6/°F		 	 ∆T=	change	in	temperature	(125°	F)		 	 L=	span	length	(in)	This	is	then	expressed	as	a	ratio	of	the	thermal	deformation	over	the	actual	width	of	the	expansion	joint	to	determine	the	over-strength	capacity	of	the	expansion	joint	(Equation	3-5).			
𝑅! = 𝐿!𝛿!"#$!"#	
Equation	3-5	
	 Where:		Rδ=	deformation	over-strength	ratio	Le=	length	of	expansion	joint	(in.)	δtemp125=	thermal	deformation	for	125°	F	temperature	difference	(in.)		 	 	
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If	the	thermal	deformation	is	greater	than	the	expansion	joint	or	if	there	is	no	expansion	joint	(i.e.	the	superstructure	is	restrained	from	expanding),	then	the	structure	must	resist	the	stresses	caused	by	the	deformation	in	Equation	3-4.		The	stress	caused	by	thermal	expansion	is	shown	in	Equation	3-6.	
𝜎!"#$!"# = 𝛿!"#$!"#𝐿 ∗ 𝐸! 	
Equation	3-6	
	 Where:		 	 σtemp125=	stress	induced	at	a	temperature	difference	of	125°	F	(ksi)		 δtemp125=	thermal	deformation	for	a	125°	F	temperature	difference	(in.)		 	 L=	span	length	(in.)			 	 Ec=	modulus	of	elasticity	of	concrete	(ksi)		 This	is	also	expressed	as	a	ratio	between	the	stress	induced	at	a	temperature	differential	of	125°	F	and	50%	of	the	compressive	strength	of	concrete	to	determine	the	over-strength	of	the	concrete	(Equation	3-7).		A	stress	in	excess	of	50%	of	the	compressive	strength	indicates	the	risk	of	concrete	crushing	due	to	service	loading	is	assumed	unacceptably	high.			
𝑅! = 0.5 ∗ 𝑓′!𝜎!"#$!"#	
Equation	3-7	
	 Where:		Rσ=	stress	over-strength	ratio	f’c=	compressive	strength	of	concrete	(ksi)		σtemp125=	stress	induced	at	a	temperature	difference	of	125°	F	(ksi)	
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		 Table	3-9	shows	the	rating	and	respective	capacity	measures	for	support	type.	If	the	ratio	is	greater	than	1,	than	there	is	over-strength	in	the	supports.		If	the	ratio	is	less	than	1,	than	there	is	under-strength	in	the	supports.			
Table	3-9:	Supports	Rating	
Rating	 Support	Type	15	 Single	span	with	integral	abutments	and	Rσ	>	1	13	 Single	span	with	expansion	joints	and	Rδ	>	1	11	 Multi	span	with	integral	abutments/piers	and	Rσ	>	1	9	 Multi	span	with	expansion	joints	and	Rδ	>	1	7	 Single	span	with	integral	abutment	and	Rσ	≤	1	5	 Multi	span	with	integral	abutments/pier	and	Rσ	≤	1	3	 Single	span	with	expansion	joint	and	Rδ	≤	1	1	 Multi	span	with	expansion	joint	and	Rδ	≤	1		Figure	3-4	shows	a	diagram	of	a	bridge	with	the	abutments	and	piers	integral	with	the	superstructure.	
	
Figure	3-4:	Bridge	with	Integral	Abutments	and	Piers	
58		
	 Figure	3-5	shows	a	depiction	of	a	bridge	with	expansion	joints	in	the	superstructure	at	the	abutments	and	piers.	
	
Figure	3-5:	Bridge	with	Expansion	Joints	
3.4.3.4 	Redundancy	To	quantify	the	redundancy	of	a	bridge,	the	capacity	of	the	entire	structure	is	compared	to	the	capacity	of	its	weakest	component.		This	method	is	a	ratio	of	the	difference	between	the	capacity	of	one	component	and	capacity	of	the	entire	bridge	over	the	capacity	of	the	entire	bridge	and	is	expressed	in	Equation	3-8:	
𝑅 = 𝑉!"#$%&!𝑉!"!#!"#𝑉!"#$%&  𝑜𝑟 𝑀!"#$%& −𝑀!"!#!$%𝑀!"#$%& 	
Equation	3-8	
	 Where:		 	 R=	redundancy	ratio		 	 Vbridge=	shear	capacity	of	the	entire	bridge		 	 Velement=	shear	capacity	of	the	weakest	element		 	 Mbridge=	flexural	capacity	of	the	entire	bridge	 		 	 Melement=	flexural	capacity	of	the	weakest	element	
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	 If	the	ratio	equal	to	zero,	then	the	bridge	is	fracture	critical;	that	is,	failure	of	a	single	component	will	result	in	a	partial	or	complete	failure	of	the	bridge.		The	closer	the	ratio	is	to	one,	the	grater	the	bridge’s	redundancy.		Table	3-10	shows	the	redundancy	rating	scores	and	respective	capacity	measures.	
Table	3-10:	Redundancy	Rating	
Rating	 Redundancy	Ratio	15	 0.85<	Ratio	≤1.0;	highly	indeterminate	13	 0.68<	Ratio	≤0.85	11	 0.51<	Ratio	≤0.68	7	 0.34<	Ratio	≤0.51	5	 0.17<	Ratio	≤0.34	3	 0<	Ratio	≤0.16	1	 Ratio	=	0;	fracture	critical	structure			 The	information	on	capacity	for	the	entire	bridge	as	well	as	the	capacity	of	a	single	member	is	determined	from	the	as-built	construction	drawings.		The	calculations	to	determine	flexural	and	shear	capacity	are	performed	by	hand	using	the	procedures	in	the	AASHTO	LRFD	Bridge	Design	Guidelines.	
3.4.3.5 Strength	Reduction	Factor		The	resilience	of	a	bridge	in	terms	of	its	failure	mode	is	rated	by	comparing	the	strength	reduction	factors	for	the	two	most	critical	failure	mechanisms.		The	ratio	of	strength	reduction	factors	is	compared	with	the	ratio	of	the	load	that	causes	the	respective	failure	modes	as	given	by	Equation	3-9.	
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%!"## = 𝐹𝑀!𝐹𝑀! − 𝜑!𝜑! 𝐹𝑀!𝐹𝑀! + 𝜑!𝜑!2 	
Equation	3-9	
	 Where:	%diff=	percent	difference	between	failure	modes	and	strength	reduction	factors	FM1=	load	of	causing	failure	mode	1	FM2=	load	of	causing	failure	mode	2	φ1=	strength	reduction	factor	associated	with	failure	mode	1	φ2=	strength	reduction	factor	associated	with	failure	mode	2		 To	illustrate	the	above	equation,	consider	the	scenario	where	failure	mode	1	and	2	coincide	with	a	strength	reduction	factor	of	0.90	and	0.75,	respectively.		If	both	failure	modes	occur	at	the	same	load,	the	percent	difference	would	be	-18%.		A	percent	difference	above	-18%	means	the	load	causing	a	ductile	failure	is	sufficiently	lower	than	the	load	causing	a	brittle	failure.		In	other	words,	a	ductile	failure	will	most	likely	occur	along	with	indications	signs	of	yielding.		A	percent	difference	below	-18%	means	the	load	causing	a	brittle	failure	is	lower	than	the	load	causing	a	ductile	failure.		In	this	case,	a	brittle	failure	is	more	likely	to	occur	before	a	ductile	failure.		The	ratings	for	this	capacity	measure	are	given	in	Table	3-11.	
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Table	3-11:	Strength	Reduction	Factor	Rating	
Rating	 Strength	Reduction	Factor		15	 %diff		>	50%	13	 33%	<	%diff		≤	50%	11	 16%	<	%diff		≤	33%	8	 -1%	<	%diff		≤	16%	6	 -18%	<	%diff		≤	-1%	4	 %diff	=-18%	2	 %diff		<	-18%	
3.4.3.6 	Scour	Protection		The	resilience	of	a	bridge	against	soil	erosion	is	rated	based	on	its	scour	protection.		The	ratings,	as	seen	in	Table	3-12,	are	based	on	varying	levels	of	scour	protection.		The	rating	values	are	taken	from	the	SI&A	report’s	“Scour	protection	countermeasures”.		
Table	3-12:	Scour	Protection	Rating	
Rating	
Scour	Protection	
Flow	Control	Type	 Floor	Protection	Type	 Bank	Protection	Type	15	 8.	N/A	 8.	Grouted	rock	 8.	Masonry	13	 7.	A	combination		 7.	A	combination		 7.	A	combination		11	 6.	Retard	 6.	Aprons	 6.	Wire	tied	rock	(Gabions)	9	 5.	Groins	or	training	dikes	 Wire	tied	pier	pads	 Dumped	rock	riprap	7	 4.	Outlet	drop	structure	 Dumped	rock	floor	 Dumped	rock	riprap	5	 3.	Wire	tied	riprap	and	rail	check	dam	 Wire	tied	riprap	 Rail	bank	3	 2.	Concrete	check	dam	 Soil	cement	floor	 Soil	cement	1	 1.	Spur	dikes	 Concrete	floor	 Concrete	slope	paving	0	 0.	No	protection/	Scour	Critical	Designation	 0.	No	protection/	Scour	Critical	Designation	 0.	No	protection/	Scour	Critical	Designation		 	Scour	protection	countermeasures	are	listed	in	the	SI&A	report	as	a	three	digit	field	coded	for	flow	control	(first	digit),	floor	protection	(second	digit),	and	bank	protection	
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(third	digit).		The	codes	are	associated	with	the	type	of	protection,	given	in	Table	3-12.		The	score	used	to	rank	soil	erosion	for	the	calculation	of	the	resilience	rating	is	taken	as	the	lowest	of	the	three	digits.	
3.4.4 	Resilience	Rating	Equation	The	resilience	rating	for	a	bridge,	Equation	3-2,	is	duplicated	as	follows	for	the	convenience	of	the	reader:	
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑊(𝑥!) ∗ 𝑅(𝑥!)!!!! 	The	resilience	rating	equation	culminates	in	combining	all	of	the	above	outlined	steps.		First,	the	resilience	indicators	are	compared	to	their	associated	capacity	measures	(valued	between	0	and	15),	as	seen	in	Table	3-13.	
Table	3-13:	Resilience	Indicator	Rating	
Capacity	Measure	 Rating,	R(x)	Foundation	Type	 -/15	Supports	 -/15	Redundancy	 -/15	Strength	Reduction	Factor	 -/15	Scour	Protection	 -/15		Second,	resilience	indicators	are	weighted	based	on	the	weight	factors	for	replacement	cost,	consequence	of	event,	and	user	cost,	as	seen	in	Table	3-14.	
63		
Table	3-14:	Resilience	Indicator	Weight	Calculation	
Resilience	Indicator	Weights	
Resilience	Indicator	 Replacement	Cost	(α)	 Consequence	of	Event	(β)	 User	Cost	(φ)	 Weight	Factor,	WF	(α*β*φ)	 Weight,	W(x)	(WF/ΣWFi)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 	 	 	 	 	Extreme	Temperature	 	 	 	 	 	Load	Path	 	 	 	 	 	Failure	Mode	 	 	 	 	 	Soil	Erosion	 	 	 	 	 		Finally,	the	resilience	rating	will	be	calculated	by	multiplying	each	resilience	indicator	rating	with	its	corresponding	weight	percentage	and	summing	the	value,	as	seen	in	Table	3-15.	
Table	3-15:	Resilience	Rating	
Resilience	Rating	Calculation	Resilience	Indicator	 W(x)×	R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 	Extreme	Temperature	 	Load	Path	 	Failure	Mode	 	Soil	Erosion	 	Resilience	Rating,	RR=	 =[ΣW(x)×R(x)]		
3.5 Selection	of	Sample		A	summary	of	the	bridges	chosen	for	the	comparative	case	study	can	be	seen	in	Table	3-16:	
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Table	3-16:	Selected	Sample	Bridges		 High	Sufficiency	
Rating	
Low	Sufficiency	
Rating	
High	Resilience	Rating	 Coyote	Wash	Bridge	 Earp	Wash	Bridge	
Low	Resilience	Rating	 Tanner	Wash	Bridge	 Midgley	Bridge		
	
Figure	3-6:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge		 The	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	in	Prescott,	AZ	was	chosen	for	the	high	sufficiency	and	an	expected	high	resilience	rating.		The	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	was	built	in	2012	and	the	sufficiency	rating	is	99.90	from	the	last	inspection	on	September	21,	2017.		A	high	resilience	rating	is	anticipated	because	of	the	bridge’s	high	ratings	in	various	categories	in	the	SI&A	report.		For	example,	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	has	a	scour	critical	rating	of	8	out	of	9,	rock	riprap	along	the	bank,	drilled	shaft	foundations,	and	expansion	joints.	
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a)	 	
b)	 	
Figure	3-7:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	a)	view	looking	north	and	b)	looking	west		 The	Earp	Wash	Bridge	in	Tucson,	AZ	was	chosen	for	its	low	sufficiency	and	high	anticipated	resilience	rating.		The	Earp	Wash	Bridge	was	built	in	1958	and	expanded	in	1985	and	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	49.50.		This	bridge	was	chosen	for	a	high	expected	resilience	rating	due	to	various	categories	found	in	the	SI&A	report.		For	example,	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge	has	a	scour	critical	rating	of	8	out	of	9,	rail	bank	protection,	a	short	detour	length	of	1	mile,	and	a	reinforced	concrete	slab	superstructure	integral	with	the	substructure.			
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Figure	3-8:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge		 The	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	in	Page,	AZ	was	chosen	for	the	high	sufficiency	and	an	anticipated	low	resilience	rating.		Tanner	Wash	Bridge	was	built	in	1980	and	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	77.10.		This	bridge	is	expected	to	have	a	low	resilience	rating	due	to	its	scour	data.		Although	the	bridge	is	not	scour	critical,	the	scour	critical	rating	is	a	5.		The	bridge	also	has	no	scour	countermeasures	installed	and	the	foundation	is	a	spread	footing	on	bedrock.	
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Figure	3-9:	Midgley	Bridge		 Midgley	Bridge	in	Sedona,	AZ	was	chosen	for	the	low	sufficiency	and	an	anticipated	low	resilience	rating.		This	bridge	was	constructed	in	1938	and	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	50.70.		This	bridge	was	chosen	for	the	expected	low	resilience	due	to	its	classification	as	a	fracture	critical	structure.		In	addition,	it	also	has	a	large	detour	length	of	38	miles	with	an	ADT	of	3858.	
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4 Results	
4.1 Overview		 The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	present	the	resilience	rating	results	for	the	four	case	study	bridges.		First,	information	was	gathered,	calculations	performed,	and	the	results	for	the	bridge	ratings	and	weights	are	summarized.		Next,	the	resilience	ratings	for	each	bridge	are	presented.		Then,	the	resilience	and	sufficiency	ratings	are	compared	and	contrasted.		Results	of	a	susceptibility	analysis	are	presented	demonstrating	the	practicality	of	the	proposed	approach.		Finally,	implications	and	further	applications	of	the	results	are	presented.	
4.2 Bridge	Ratings	and	Weights	
4.2.1 Coyote	Wash	Bridge		 The	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	was	selected	for	its	high	sufficiency	rating	of	99.9	and	an	anticipated	high	resilience	rating.		The	following	section	provides	details	of	the	ratings	and	weights	for	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge.	
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Figure	4-1:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	
4.2.1.1 Resilience	Indicators	Ranked	by	Capacity	Measures		 The	following	table	shows	all	five	resilience	indicators	and	their	rating	for	each	capacity	measure.	
Table	4-1:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Indicator	Ratings	
Resilience	Indicator		 Capacity	Measure	Type	 Rating	 R(x)	Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	 9:	Drilled	shaft	or	caisson	 15	 15/15	Extreme	Temperature	 Single span with expansion joints 
and Rδ > 1	 13	 13/15	Redundancy	 0.87	 15	 15/15	Failure	Mode	 0.38	 8	 8/15	Soil	Erosion	 0:	No	protection	 0	 0/15		
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4.2.1.1.1 Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	versus	Foundation	Type		 In	order	to	rate	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	for	its	foundation	type,	the	SI&A	report	was	used.		From	the	report,	the	foundation	is	listed	as	a	drilled	shaft	or	caisson	type.		The	as-built	construction	plans	confirm	the	bridge	has	66-inch	diameter	drilled	shaft	foundations	at	the	abutments.		Using	the	rating	scale	given	in	Table	3-8,	the	bridge	was	rated	a	15,	as	seen	in	Table	4-1.	
4.2.1.1.2 Extreme	Temperature	versus	Support	Type		 The	Coyote	Wash	Bridge’s	superstructure	is	a	single	span	and	has	expansion	joints	at	the	abutments.		Since	there	are	expansion	joints,	the	change	in	length	caused	by	a	temperature	differential	of	125°	F	is	compared	to	the	actual	length	of	the	expansion	joints.		Using	the	rating	scale	given	in	Table	3-9,	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	is	ranked	as	seen	in	Table	4-1.	Detailed	calculations	are	provided	in	Appendix	A.	
4.2.1.1.3 Load	Path	versus	Redundancy		 In	order	to	quantify	redundancy,	the	capacity	of	one	component	of	the	bridge	is	compared	to	the	overall	capacity	of	the	bridge.		For	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge,	the	flexural	capacity	of	a	single	AASTHO	type	VI	girder	is	calculated.		Then,	the	flexural	capacity	all	six	girders	and	the	8”	slab	was	calculated.		Detailed	calculations	are	given	in	Appendix	B.		The	redundancy	ratio	was	determined	to	be	0.8675,	which,	according	to	Table	3-10	results	in	a	rating	of	15	(Table	4-1).	
4.2.1.1.4 Failure	Mode	versus	Strength	Reduction	Factor		 The	resilience	indicator	for	load	path	is	quantified	with	the	strength	reduction	factor	capacity	measure	using	Equation	3-9.		For	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge,	the	load	that	causes	a	flexural	failure	is	calculated	and	compared	to	the	load	that	causes	a	shear	failure.		
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Detailed	calculations	are	given	in	Appendix	C.		The	load	causing	a	flexural	failure	is	534	kip	and	the	load	causing	shear	failure	is	937	kip.		This	leads	to	a	percent	difference	between	the	failure	loads	and	their	respective	strength	reduction	factors	(0.90	and	0.75)	of	0.38.	According	to	Table	3-11,	this	value	results	in	a	rating	of	8	as	listed	above	in	Table	4-1.	
4.2.1.1.5 Soil	Erosion	versus	Scour	Protection		 To	rate	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	for	scour	protection,	information	from	the	SI&A	report	is	used.		From	the	report,	the	scour	protection	countermeasure	described	as	‘no	scour	protection’	for	floor	protection	or	flow	control	but	bank	protection	is	‘dumped	rock	riprap’.		Since	the	lowest	of	the	three	scores	is	used.		According	to	Table	3-12	a	rating	of	9	is	calculated	(Table	4-1).	
4.2.1.2 	Weight	Factors		 The	following	section	presents	the	weight	factors	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge.			
4.2.1.2.1 Replacement	Cost		 The	replacement	cost	rating	is	determined	according	to	Table	3-5	based	on	the	ratio	of	the	size	of	the	component	to	the	size	of	the	entire	bridge	(Table	4-2).	
Table	4-2:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	Replacement	Cost	Weigh	Factor		
Resilience	Indicator	 Replacement	Cost	(%)	 Weight	Factor		Pier/Abutment	Washout	 25+	 5	Extreme	Temperature	 14	 3	Load	Path	 4	 1.5	Failure	Mode	 4	 1.5	Soil	Erosion	 25+	 5		
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Since	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	does	not	have	piers,	only	the	abutment	sizes	are	compared	to	the	entire	bridge.		The	abutments	are	over	25%	of	the	structure.		For	extreme	temperature,	the	superstructure	is	considered.		Since	this	bridge	is	wide,	at	75.75	feet,	the	superstructure	is	14%	of	the	bridge.		A	single	girder	is	used	to	represent	a	failure	due	to	load	path	and	failure	mode.		A	girder	is	4%	of	the	structure.		For	soil	erosion,	the	abutments	are	considered	since	these	are	the	only	components	affected	by	scour.	
4.2.1.2.2 Consequence	of	Event		 The	weight	factors	are	determined	based	on	Table	3-6,	as	shown	in	Table	4-3.			
Table	4-3:	Coyote	Wash	Consequence	of	Event	Weight	Factor		
Resilience	Indicator	 Consequence	of	Event	 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 Out	of	service	 5	Extreme	Temperature	 N/A	 -	Load	Path	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Failure	Mode	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Soil	Erosion	 Triggers	deterioration	 2		 The	consequence	of	event	weight	factor	is	determined	by	identifying	the	state	of	the	bridge	after	damage	from	the	respective	resilience	indicator.		For	example,	if	a	pier	or	abutment	washed	out	on	Coyote	Wash	Bridge,	the	bridge	would	be	out	of	service.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	extreme	temperature	differentials,	the	change	in	length	would	be	less	than	the	length	of	the	expansion	joints.		There	would	be	no	consequence	from	this	because	there	is	no	worry	about	inducing	stress	in	the	reinforcement.		If	a	single	component	were	to	fail	on	the	bridge,	the	load	path	would	change	and	immediate	repairs	and/or	replacement	would	be	needed.		This	would	also	apply	to	failure	mode	if	a	
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component	were	to	fail	suddenly	and	without	warning.		Erosion	of	the	soil	would	trigger	deterioration.		
4.2.1.2.3 User	Cost			 The	user	cost	weight	factor	is	determined	according	to	Equation	3-1.	Detailed	calculations	are	provided	in	Appendix	D.			The	calculation	of	the	user	cost	assumes	the	bridge	is	out	of	service	for	each	resilience	indicator.		Several	items	from	the	SI&A	report	are	used	to	calculate	a	user	cost	value	of	14.95,	which	results	in	a	rating	of	1.5	(Table	3-7)	for	all	resilience	indicators.		However,	because	the	consequence	of	pier	or	abutments	washout	is	the	bridge	being	“out	of	service”,	the	user	cost	weight	factor	goes	up	to	2	since	there	is	a	1	mile	detour.		Since	extreme	temperature	would	only	warrant	further	testing	or	investigation,	traffic	on	the	bridge	would	not	be	affected.		The	weight	factor	of	1.5	remains.		Damage	due	to	load	path	and	failure	mode	would	result	in	immediate	repairs,	which	could	cause	lane	closures	and	delays.		This	results	in	a	weight	factor	of	1.5,	which	is	equal	to	the	
S3	rating.		Soil	erosion	would	trigger	deterioration	and	would	not	immediately	affect	traffic,	so	the	rating	of	1.5	from	S3	remains.		The	user	cost	weight	factors	for	each	resilience	indicator	are	shown	in	Table	4-4.	
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Table	4-4:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	User	Cost	Weigh	Factor		
Resilience	Indicator	 User	Cost	(S3)	 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 Detour	0-50	miles	 2	Extreme	Temperature	 14.95	 1.5	Load	Path	 14.95	Delays/number	of	lanes	reduced	 1.5	Failure	Mode	 14.95	Delays/number	of	lanes	reduced	 1.5	Soil	Erosion	 14.95	 1.5	
4.2.1.3 	Resilience	Indicator	Weights		 Taking	the	weight	factors	from	Tables	4-2	to	4-4,	the	weights	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	are	calculated,	as	shown	in	Table	4-5.	
Table	4-5:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	Weights	
Resilience	Indicator	
Composite	Weight	
Factor,	WF	
(α×β×φ)	 Weight,	W(x)	%	(WF/ΣWFi)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 50	 60.2	Extreme	Temperature	 4.5	 5.4	Load	Path	 6.8	 8.1	Failure	Mode	 6.8	 8.1	Soil	Erosion	 15	 18.1		
4.2.2 	Tanner	Wash	Bridge		 The	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	selected	for	its	high	sufficiency	rating	of	77.10	and	an	anticipated	low	resilience	rating.		The	following	section	details	and	provides	explanation	how	the	ratings	and	weights	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	are	determined.	
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Figure	4-2:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	
4.2.2.1 	Resilience	Indicators	Ranked	by	Capacity	Measures		 The	following	table	shows	all	five	resilience	indicators	and	their	rating	for	each	capacity	measure.			
Table	4-6:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Indicator	Ratings	
Resilience	Indicator		 Capacity	Measure	Type	 Rating	 R(x)	Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	 3:	Spread	on	bedrock	 6	 6/15	Extreme	Temperature	 Multi span with expansion joint and Rδ ≤ 1	 1	 1/15	Redundancy	 0.87	 15	 15/15	Failure	Mode	 1.35	 8	 8/15	Soil	Erosion	 0:	No	protection	 0	 0/15		
4.2.2.1.1 Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	versus	Foundation	Type		 In	order	to	determine	the	type	of	foundation	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge,	the	SI&A	report	was	consulted.		In	the	report,	foundation	type	was	coded	‘33’,	which	means	that	both	the	piers	and	abutments	have	spread	footings	on	bedrock.		The	rating	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	foundation	type	is	found	in	Table	3-8,	as	shown	in	Table	4-6.		
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4.2.2.1.2 Extreme	Temperature	versus	Support	Type		 The	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	a	three	span	bridge	that	has	a	2-in.	expansion	joint.		The	length	of	the	expansion	joint	will	be	compared	with	the	change	in	length	caused	by	an	extreme	temperature.		As	seen	in	Appendix	A,	the	change	in	length	is	2.11	in.	and	was	calculated	using	Equation	3-3.		Since	the	actual	length	of	the	expansion	joint	is	less	than	the	change	in	length,	stress	will	be	induced	in	the	slab.	This	means	the	bridge	fits	into	the	‘Multi 
span with expansion joint and Rδ ≤ 1’ category	and	was	rated	a	1	in	accordance	with	Table	3-9	and	shown	in	Table	4-6.	
4.2.2.1.3 	Load	Path	versus	Redundancy		 To	determine	the	redundancy	ratio	of	Tanner	Wash	Bridge,	the	flexural	capacity	of	a	single	AASHTO	Type	III	girder	is	compared	to	the	flexural	capacity	of	all	five	Type	III	girders	and	the	9-in.	thick	slab.		As	seen	in	Appendix	B,	the	flexural	capacity	of	a	single	girder	is	3,300	k-ft	and	the	flexural	capacity	of	the	entire	bridge	is	27,220	k-ft.		Given	these	flexural	capacities,	the	redundancy	ration	is	calculated	per	Equation	3-8	resulting	in	a	value	of	0.867.		In	accordance	with	Table	3-10,	this	ranks	the	bridge	as	a	15,	as	shown	in	Table	4-6.	
4.2.2.1.4 Failure	Mode	versus	Strength	Reduction	Factor		 The	failure	mode	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	quantified	based	on	the	percent	difference	between	the	ratio	of	the	loads	causing	flexural	and	shear	failures	and	the	ratio	of	their	respective	strength	reduction	factors.		As	seen	in	Appendix	C,	the	load	causing	flexural	failure	is	752	kip	and	the	load	causing	shear	failure	is	1,982	kip.		Using	Equation	3-9,	the	percent	difference	between	the	failure	modes	and	strength	reduction	factors	is	0.75.		This	results	in	a	rating	of	8	using	Table	3-11,	as	shown	in	Table	4-6.	
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4.2.2.1.5 Soil	Erosion	versus	Scour	Protection				 The	SI&A	report	is	used	to	determine	the	type	of	scour	protection	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge.			In	the	report,	the	scour	protection	countermeasure	is	coded	a	‘000’,	which	means	there	is	no	protection	for	flow	control,	the	waterway	floor,	or	the	bank.		The	resulting	rating	is	a	0,	as	found	in	Table	3-12	and	shown	in	Table	4-6.			
4.2.2.2 		Weight	Factors		 The	following	section	presents	the	weight	factors	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge.			
4.2.2.2.1 Replacement	Cost		 The	replacement	cost	weight	factor	is	calculated	by	comparing	the	volume	of	a	single	component	of	the	bridge	to	the	entire	structure.		The	resilience	indicators	are	rated	using	Table	3-5,	as	shown	in	Table	4-7.	
Table	4-7:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Replacement	Cost	Weight	Factor		
Resilience	Indicator	 Replacement	Cost	(%)	 Weight	Factor		Pier/Abutment	Washout	 25+	 5	Extreme	Temperature	 16	 4	Load	Path	 5	 1.5	Failure	Mode	 5	 1.5	Soil	Erosion	 25+	 5		 As	seen	in	Appendix	E,	the	superstructure	accounts	for	16.3%,	the	piers	account	for	5.7%	each,	the	barriers	account	for	5.3%,	the	abutments	account	for	20.1%	for	each	side,	and	the	girders	account	for	5.3%	each	of	the	structure.	When	determining	the	weight	factor	for	pier	or	abutment	washout,	the	higher	of	the	percentages	for	a	single	abutment	or	pier	is	
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used.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	an	extreme	temperature	differential,	the	superstructure	alone	would	be	affected.		If	there	were	a	failure	due	to	load	path	or	an	unexpected	sudden	failure,	a	single	girder	is	most	likely	to	fail.		The	rating	for	soil	erosion	also	uses	the	higher	of	the	two	percentages	for	a	single	pier	or	abutment.	
4.2.2.2.2 Consequence	of	Event		 The	consequence	of	event	weight	factor	describes	the	state	of	the	bridge’s	functionality	after	a	complete	failure	due	to	the	specified	resilience	indicator.			The	resilience	indicators	were	rated	based	on	Table	3-6,	as	shown	in	Table	4-8.	
Table	4-8:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Consequence	of	Event	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 Consequence	of	Event	 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Extreme	Temperature	 Warrants	testing	or	investigation	 1.5	Load	Path	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Failure	Mode	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Soil	Erosion	 Triggers	deterioration	 2		 Since	the	bridge	has	two	piers	and	abutments,	the	washout	of	one	would	not	destroy	the	entire	structure.		However,	a	washout	would	require	immediate	repairs	or	replacement	in	order	to	regain	functionality.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	an	extreme	temperature	differential	and	the	deformation	produced	stresses,	an	investigation	would	need	to	be	performed	to	determine	if	stresses	would	be	induced	in	the	reinforcement	that	could	lead	to	yielding.		Due	to	the	bridges	multiple	girders,	load	path	and	failure	mode	were	analyzed	as	if	one	were	to	fail.		In	both	cases,	it	would	require	immediate	repairs	or	replacement.		If	
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the	bridge	were	to	experience	scour	due	to	soil	erosion,	the	piers	and	abutments	would	experience	deterioration.	
4.2.2.2.3 User	Cost			 The	user	cost	weight	factor,	S3,	is	calculated	using	Equation	3-1.		S3	was	determined	to	be	4.70	and	is	weighted	according	to	Table	3-7	(as	shown	in	Table	4-9).	
Table	4-9:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	User	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 User	Cost		 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 4.70	Detour	over	98	miles	 3	Extreme	Temperature	 4.70	 3	Load	Path	 4.70	Detour	over	98	miles	 3	Failure	Mode	 4.70	Detour	over	98	miles	 3	Soil	Erosion	 4.70	 3		 Several	items	from	the	SI&A	report	are	used	in	this	calculation.		Due	to	its	large	detour	length,	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	very	costly	to	users	and	reduces	its	resilience.		The	user	cost,	S3,	of	4.70	results	in	a	rating	of	3	for	the	entire	bridge.		Even	though	pier/abutment	washout,	load	path,	and	failure	mode	have	a	consequence	of	event	of	immediate	repairs	or	replacement,	the	detour	length	of	99	miles	gives	it	the	same	rating	as	
S3.	
4.2.2.3 		Resilience	Indicator	Weights		 After	the	replacement	cost,	consequence	of	event,	and	user	costs	were	rated,	the	composite	weight	factors	(WF)	are	calculated.		Multiplying	the	values	from	Tables	4-7	through	4-9	together	for	each	respective	capacity	measure	did	this.		The	weight,	W(x),	is	
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determined	using	the	ratio	of	each	weight	factors	and	the	sum	of	all	the	weight	factors	(Equation	3-3).		The	weights	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	are	shown	in	Table	4-10.			
Table	4-10:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Weights	
Resilience	Indicator	
Composite	Weight	
Factor,	WF	
(α×β×φ)	 Weight,	W(x)	%	(WF/ΣWFi)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 45	 37.5	Extreme	Temperature	 18	 15	Load	Path	 13.5	 11.25	Failure	Mode	 13.5	 11.25	Soil	Erosion	 30	 25		
4.2.3 	Earp	Wash	Bridge		 The	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	selected	for	its	low	sufficiency	rating	of	49.5	and	an	anticipated	high	resilience	rating.		The	following	section	details	and	provides	a	detailed	explanation	why	the	ratings	and	weights	for	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge	are	determined.		
81		
	
Figure	4-3:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	
4.2.3.1 Resilience	Indicators	Ranked	by	Capacity	Measures	The	following	table	shows	all	five	resilience	indicators	and	their	rating	for	each	capacity	measure.	
Table	4-11:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Indicator	Rating	
Resilience	Indicator		 Capacity	Measure	Type	 Rating	 R(x)	Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	 4:	Steel	H	piles	 8	 8/15	Extreme	Temperature	 Multi span with integral 
abutments/pier and Rσ ≤ 1	 3	 3/15	Redundancy	 0.98	 15	 15/15	Failure	Mode	 -0.09	 6	 6/15	Soil	Erosion	 0:	No	protection	 0	 0/15		
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4.2.3.1.1 Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	versus	Foundation	Type		 The	SI&A	report	is	used	to	determine	the	type	of	foundations	for	the	piers	and	abutments	of	Earp	Wash	Bridge.		In	the	report,	the	foundation	type	was	coded	‘44’,	meaning	that	both	the	abutments	and	the	piers	have	steel	H	pile	foundations.			The	as-built	construction	drawings	confirmed	that	the	piles	are	steel	H	piles,	with	five	at	each	abutment	and	six	at	each	pier.		The	rating	for	foundation	type	is	determined	as	detailed	in	Table	3-8	and	is	shown	in	table	4-11.	
4.2.3.1.2 Extreme	Temperature	versus	Support	Type		 Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	a	four	span	bridge	with	integral	abutments	and	piers.		The	bridge	does	not	have	expansion	joints.		The	total	length	of	the	bridge	is	92	feet,	which	results	in	a	stress	induced	by	extreme	temperature	change	of	2810	psi.		The	bridge	was	built	in	1958,	so	the	compressive	strength	of	the	concrete	is	only	3000	psi	according	to	the	as-built	construction	plans.		This	means	that	the	stresses	induced	by	an	extreme	change	in	temperature	are	higher	than	50%	of	the	compressive	strength.		The	rating	for	the	support	type	is	given	in	Table	3-9	and	shown	in	Table	4-11.	
4.2.3.1.3 Load	Path	versus	Redundancy		 In	order	to	quantify	redundancy,	a	ratio	between	the	difference	between	the	capacity	of	a	single	member	and	the	entire	structure	over	the	capacity	of	the	entire	structure	is	used.		Since	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	a	slab	bridge,	this	is	determined	by	comparing	the	flexural	capacity	of	a	12-in.	wide	section	of	the	10.5-in.	thick	slab	to	the	flexural	capacity	of	the	entire	40.7-ft.	wide	structure.	As	shown	in	Appendix	B,	the	flexural	capacity	of	a	12-in.	wide	section	of	the	bridge	was	found	to	be	294	k-in	and	the	entire	
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bridge	to	be	11,940	k-in.		Thus,	according	to	Equation	3-8,	the	redundancy	ratio	is	0.975,	resulting	in	a	rating	of	15	in	accordance	with	Table	3-10	and	shown	in	Table	4-11.	
4.2.3.1.4 Failure	Mode	versus	Strength	Reduction	Factor		 The	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	a	slab	bridge	with	transverse	and	longitudinal	reinforcement.		However,	there	are	no	stirrups	in	the	slab	to	resist	shear.		Therefore,	the	only	component	of	the	bridge	that	is	able	to	resist	shear	is	the	concrete	slab.		As	shown	in	Appendix	C,	the	load	causing	shear	failure	of	the	bridge	is	4.3	kip	and	the	load	causing	flexural	failure	is	3.9	kip.		Using	Equation	3-9,	this	results	in	a	percent	difference	between	failure	loads	and	strength	reduction	factors	of	-0.09.		The	resulting	rating	is	a	6	using	Table	3-11	and	shown	in	Table	4-11.	
4.2.3.1.5 Soil	Erosion	versus	Scour	Protection		 To	determine	the	type	of	scour	protection	countermeasures	used	on	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge,	the	SI&A	report	is	consulted.		In	the	report,	scour	countermeasure	is	coded	‘003’.		This	means	there	is	no	scour	protection	for	flow	control	or	the	waterway	floor,	but	there	is	a	rail	bank	for	the	bank	protection.			Although	there	is	bank	protection	provided,	the	lowest	of	the	three	digits	in	the	code	controls.		Therefore,	the	scour	protection	is	rated	a	0	based	on	Table	3-12	and	shown	in	Table	4-11.	
4.2.3.2 	Weight	Factors		 The	following	section	presents	the	weight	factors	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge.			
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4.2.3.2.1 Replacement	Cost		 The	replacement	cost	weight	factor	is	determined	by	comparing	the	volume	of	each	component	to	the	entire	volume	of	the	bridge.		All	of	the	replacement	costs	weight	factors	were	determined	based	on	Table	3-5	and	shown	in	Table	4-12.	
Table	4-12:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	Replacement	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 Replacement	Cost	(%)	 Weight	Factor		Pier/Abutment	Washout	 17	 4	Extreme	Temperature	 25+	 5	Load	Path	 25+	 5	Failure	Mode	 25+	 5	Soil	Erosion	 17	 4		 As	seen	in	Appendix	E,	the	superstructure	accounts	for	68%,	the	piers	account	for	5.3%	each,	the	barriers	account	for	11.36%	and	the	abutments	account	for	5.6%	each	of	the	entire	structure.		When	rating	the	pier	or	abutment	washout,	the	replacement	cost	for	either	a	single	abutment	or	pier	is	used.		The	controlling	replacement	cost	is	an	abutment,	at	5.6%.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	failure	due	to	extreme	temperature,	the	superstructure	with	a	replacement	cost	of	68%	would	most	likely	be	the	cause	of	failure.		If	there	were	failure	due	to	a	change	in	load	path	or	an	unexpected	sudden	failure,	the	superstructure	would	again	be	the	likely	source	of	failure.		The	replacement	cost	of	either	a	single	abutment	or	pier	is	used	to	rate	the	soil	erosion.		
4.2.3.2.2 Consequence	of	Event		 The	level	of	functionality	of	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	used	codetermine	the	consequence	of	event	weight	factor,	which	was	determined	in	accordance	with	Table	3-6	and	as	summarized	in	Table	4-13.	
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Table	4-13:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	Consequence	of	Event	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 Consequence	of	Event	 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Extreme	Temperature	 Warrants	testing	or	investigation	 1.5	Load	Path	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3	Failure	Mode	 Out	of	service	 5	Soil	Erosion	 Requires	immediate	repair/replacement	 3		 If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	the	washout	of	a	single	abutment,	immediate	repairs	or	replacement	of	the	washed	out	component	would	be	required	to	regain	full	functionality.		If	the	bridge	were	subjected	to	an	extreme	temperature	differential,	stresses	would	be	induced	in	the	reinforcement	steel.		This	would	result	in	the	need	for	further	testing	or	investigation	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	newly	induced	stresses	significantly	affect	the	integrity	of	the	bridge.		If	there	was	a	change	in	load	path	in	the	bridge,	immediate	repairs	would	be	required.	If	sudden,	unexpected	failure	were	to	occur,	the	deck	would	most	likely	be	the	source	of	failure	and	the	bridge	would	be	out	of	service.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	soil	erosion,	a	single	pier	or	abutment	would	be	the	source	of	failure.		This	would	result	in	the	need	for	immediate	repairs	or	replacements	in	order	to	regain	full	functionality.		
4.2.3.2.3 User	Cost			 To	determine	the	user	cost	weight	factor,	S3,	Equation	3-1	is	used.			The	user	cost	weight	factor	is	determined	in	accordance	with	Table	3-7	and	the	ratings	are	shown	in	Table	4-14.	
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Table	4-14:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	User	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 User	Cost		 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 9.95	Temporary	closure	and	detour	0-50	miles	 2	Extreme	Temperature	 9.95	 2	Load	Path	 9.95	Temporary	closure	and	detour	0-50	miles	 2	Failure	Mode	 Out	of	service	 5	Soil	Erosion	 9.95	Temporary	closure	and	detour	0-50	miles	 2		 Earp	Wash	Bridge	has	a	condition	rating	of	‘4’	for	the	superstructure,	which	means	it	is	in	poor	condition.		This	resulted	in	a	low	score	for	structural	adequacy	and	safety.		The	bridge	also	scored	low	in	serviceability	and	functional	obsolescence.		These	two	attributes	make	the	bridge	costly	for	users.		Although	the	bridge	has	a	very	large	ADT	of	34,500,	the	detour	length	is	1	mile.		The	high	ADT	did	not	have	a	large	effect	on	the	user	cost.	The	user	cost,	S3,	of	9.95	gives	the	entire	bridge	a	rating	of	2.		Although	pier/abutment	washout,	load	path,	and	soil	erosion	would	all	results	in	repairs	or	replacements,	the	rating	did	not	change	because	it	is	the	same	as	the	S3	rating	for	the	entire	bridge.		However,	since	the	consequence	of	event	for	failure	mode	is	out	of	service,	the	user	cost	is	also	out	of	service,	giving	it	a	rating	of	5.	
4.2.3.3 	Resilience	Indicator	Weights		 After	the	replacement	cost,	consequence	of	event,	and	user	cost	weight	factors	were	determined,	the	composite	weight	factors	(WF)	were	found.		Multiplying	the	values	from	Tables	4-12	through	4-14	together	for	each	respective	capacity	measure	did	this.		The	weight,	W(x),	is	calculated	using	the	ratio	of	each	weight	factors	and	the	sum	of	all	the	
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weight	factors	(Equation	3-3).		The	weights	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	Earp	Wash	Bridge	are	given	in	Table	4-15.			
Table	4-15:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	Weights	
Resilience	Indicator	
Composite	Weight	
Factor,	WF	
(α×β×φ)	 Weight,	W(x)	%	(WF/ΣWFi)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 24	 11	Extreme	Temperature	 15	 6.9	Load	Path	 30	 13.8	Failure	Mode	 125	 57.3	Soil	Erosion	 24	 11		
4.2.4 	Midgley	Bridge		 The	Midgley	Bridge	is	selected	for	its	low	sufficiency	rating	of	50.7	and	an	anticipated	low	resilience	rating.		The	following	section	details	and	provides	explanation	how	the	ratings	and	weights	for	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	are	determined.	
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Figure	4-4:	Midgley	Bridge	
4.2.4.1 Resilience	Indicators	Ranked	by	Capacity	Measures		 The	following	table	shows	all	five	resilience	indicators	and	their	rating	for	each	capacity	measure.	
Table	4-16:	Midgley	Bridge	Resilience	Indicator	Ratings	
Resilience	Indicator		 Capacity	Measure	Type	 Rating	 R(x)	Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	 3:	Spread	on	bedrock	 6	 6/15	Extreme	Temperature	 Multi span with expansion joints and Rδ > 1	 9	 9/15	Redundancy	 Fracture	critical	structure	 1	 1/15	Failure	Mode	 1.50	 8	 8/15	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 -	 -/15		
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4.2.4.1.1 Pier	or	Abutment	Washout	versus	Foundation	Type		 The	SI&A	report	is	consulted	to	determine	the	type	of	foundation	on	Midgley	Bridge.		The	foundation	type	is	coded	as	‘33’	in	the	report,	which	means	the	foundations	for	both	the	piers	and	abutments	are	spread	footings	on	bedrock.		According	to	Table	3-8,	this	results	in	a	rating	of	6	as	presented	in	Table	4-16.	
4.2.4.1.2 Extreme	Temperature	versus	Support	Type		 Seeing	as	Midgley	Bridge	is	a	four	span	bridge	with	expansion	joints	in	the	deck,	the	support	type	rating	is	determined	by	comparing	the	required	expansion	joint	length	for	a	temperature	differential	of	125°	F	to	the	actual	width	of	the	expansion	joint	(Equation	3-4).		The	length	between	expansion	joints	is	240	ft.,	which	results	in	a	required	expansion	joint	width	of	2.59	in.		As	seen	in	Appendix	A,	the	actual	width	of	the	expansion	joint	is	larger	than	required.		Based	on	Table	3-9,	the	support	type	of	‘Multi span with expansion joints and 
Rδ > 1’	results	in	a	rating	of	9,	as	summarized	in	Table	4-16.	
4.2.4.1.3 Load	Path	versus	Redundancy		 Since	the	Midgley	Bridge	is	designated	as	fracture	critical	in	the	SI&A	report,	no	capacity	calculations	are	needed.		From	Table	3-10,	the	redundancy	rating	for	a	fracture	critical	structure	is	1,	as	summarized	above	in	Table	4-16.	
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4.2.4.1.4 Failure	Mode	versus	Strength	Reduction	Factor	
	 	
Figure	4-5:	Truss	Layout	of	Midgley	Bridge	By	comparing	the	gross	area	of	cross	sections	provided	versus	required	for	each	member,	it	was	found	that	L1-L2	and	L3-L4	are	the	highest	stressed	members	in	the	truss.		The	bearing	strength	and	block	shear	are	analyzed	for	each	connection	in	the	two	highest	stressed	members,	as	seen	in	Appendix	F.		Comparing	the	capacities	for	the	two	highest	stressed	members,	the	connections	in	member	L3-L4	controlled.		As	shown	in	Appendix	G,	the	load	causing	a	failure	in	bearing	strength	is	46	kips	and	the	load	causing	a	block	shear	failure	is	325	kips.		This	results	in	a	percent	difference	in	the	strength	reduction	factors	of	1.5,	using	Equation	3-9.		The	resulting	rating	is	an	8	using	Table	3-11	and	shown	in	Table	4-16.	
4.2.4.1.5 Soil	Erosion	versus	Scour	Protection		 As	seen	in	Figure	3-9,	Midgley	Bridge	is	over	a	canyon	and	the	foundations	sit	well	above	the	waterway	below.		There	are	no	scour	protection	countermeasures	because	the	
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bridge	is	not	subjected	to	scour.		Therefore,	the	scour	protection	capacity	measure	does	not	apply.	
4.2.4.2 	Weight	Factors		 The	following	section	presents	the	weight	factors	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	Midgley	Bridge.			
4.2.4.2.1 Replacement	Cost		 The	replacement	cost	weight	factors	for	Midgley	Bridge	were	found	by	comparing	the	weight	of	each	component	to	the	weight	of	the	entire	bridge.		The	weight	is	compared	instead	of	the	volume	due	to	the	age	of	the	construction	drawings	and	the	information	it	provides.		These	percentages	are	then	rated	based	on	the	information	given	in	Table	3-5,	as	shown	in	Table	4-17.	
Table	4-17:	Midgley	Bridge	Replacement	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 Replacement	Cost	(%)	 Weight	Factor		Pier/Abutment	Washout	 16	 4	Extreme	Temperature	 16	 4	Load	Path	 20	 4	Failure	Mode	 20	 4	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 -			 As	seen	in	Appendix	E,	one	pier	or	abutment	accounts	for	16%	of	the	structure.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	a	failure	due	to	extreme	temperature,	the	deck	would	be	affected.		This	also	accounts	for	16%	of	the	total	structure.		Failure	due	to	load	path	would	come	from	a	failure	in	the	truss,	which	is	20%	of	the	structure.		Failure	from	failure	mode	is	
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also	seen	in	the	truss.		Since	the	foundations	of	the	bridge	are	well	above	the	waterway,	the	bridge	is	not	susceptible	to	scour.		Soil	erosion	is	not	applicable.	
4.2.4.2.2 Consequence	of	Event		 The	consequence	of	event	weight	factors	are	determined	in	accordance	with	Table	3-6	as	shown	below	in	Table	4-18.	
Table	4-18:	Midgley	Bridge	Consequence	of	Event	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 Consequence	of	Event	 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 Requires	immediate	repair	or	replacement	 3	Extreme	Temperature	 Warrants	testing	or	investigation	 1.5	Load	Path	 Out	of	service	 5	Failure	Mode	 Out	of	service	 5	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 -		 Although	the	bridge	is	not	susceptible	to	loss	of	a	pier	or	an	abutment	due	to	scour,	there	is	a	loss	potential	to	falling	boulders.		As	seen	in	the	Bridge	Inspection	Photographs,	part	of	the	sway	frame	is	currently	damaged	from	a	boulder	impact.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	a	loss	of	a	pier	or	abutment,	immediate	repairs	or	replacement	would	be	required.		Since	the	expansion	joints	are	larger	than	the	change	in	length	resulting	from	an	extreme	change	in	temperature,	the	consequence	would	at	most	require	testing	or	investigation.	If	Midgley	Bridge	were	to	experience	the	loss	of	a	member	that	resulted	in	a	change	in	load	path,	the	entire	bridge	could	fail	due	to	the	fracture	critical	and	non-redundant	nature	of	the	bridge.		This	would	cause	the	bridge	to	be	out	of	service.		This	is	also	true	for	a	failure	that	occurs	with	little	to	no	warning.		If	a	member	were	lost	due	to	a	sudden,	unexpected	failure,	the	entire	bridge	could	fail	due	to	non-redundancy.		This	would	
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cause	the	bridge	to	be	out	of	service.		Because	the	bridge	is	not	susceptible	to	scour,	the	soil	erosion	resilience	indicator	is	not	applicable.		
4.2.4.2.3 User	Cost			 The	user	cost	weight	factor,	S3,	was	calculated	using	Equation	3-1.		The	results	of	this	analysis	are	given	in	Table	4-19.	
Table	4-19:	Midgley	Bridge	User	Cost	Weight	Factor	
Resilience	Indicator	 User	Cost		 Weight	Factor	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 6.90	 2.5	Extreme	Temperature	 6.90	 2.5	Load	Path	 Out	of	service	 5	Failure	Mode	 Out	of	service	 5	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 -		Several	items	from	the	SI&A	report	are	used	in	this	calculation.		Although	Midgley	Bridge	does	not	have	a	high	ADT	compared	to	Earp	Wash	Bridge,	an	average	of	3858	vehicles	per	day	is	significant.		This	along	with	a	detour	length	of	38	miles	makes	Midgley	Bridge	costly	to	users.		The	bridge	also	scored	low	on	its	serviceability	and	functional	obsolescence.	With	a	coding	of	‘5’	for	structural	evaluation,	the	bridge’s	load	rating	is	slightly	above	the	limit	indicating	obsolescence	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].		A	coding	of	‘2’	for	deck	geometry	means	the	size	and	number	of	lanes	on	the	bridge	are	intolerable	and	have	a	high	priority	for	corrective	action	[US	Department	of	Transportation	Federal	Highway	Administration,	1995].	These	factors	contribute	to	relatively	low	user	cost	of	6.90.	However,	the	consequence	of	load	path	and	
94		
failure	mode	would	render	the	bridge	out	of	service.		Therefore,	the	user	cost	for	these	two	resilience	indicators	results	in	a	rating	of	‘5’.	
4.2.4.3 	Resilience	Indicator	Weights	After	the	replacement	cost,	consequence	of	event,	and	user	cost	weight	factors	were	determined,	the	composite	weight	factors	(WF)	were	found.		Multiplying	the	values	from	Tables	4-17	through	4-19	together	for	each	respective	capacity	measure	did	this.		The	weight,	W(x),	is	calculated	using	the	ratio	of	each	weight	factors	and	the	sum	of	all	the	weight	factors	(Equation	3-3).		The	weights	for	each	resilience	indicator	for	Midgley	Bridge	are	summarized	in	Table	4-20.				
Table	4-20:	Midgley	Bridge	Weights	
Resilience	Indicator	
Composite	Weight	
Factor,	WF	
(α×β×φ)	 Weight,	W(x)	%	(WF/ΣWFi)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 30	 12.2	Extreme	Temperature	 15	 6.1	Load	Path	 100	 40.8	Failure	Mode	 100	 40.8	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 -		
4.3 Resilience	Rating	Calculation	
4.3.1 	Coyote	Wash	Bridge		 The	resilience	rating	for	the	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	is	determined	using	the	Indicators	and	User	Cost	ratings	(Table	4-1)	and	Weights	(Table	4-5).	As	seen	in	Table	4-21,	the	resilience	rating	for	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	is	77.4.		
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Table	4-21:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Rating	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x)×R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 58.1	 15/15	 58.1	Extreme	Temperature	 8.7	 13/15	 7.5	Load	Path	 7.9	 15/15	 7.9	Failure	Mode	 7.9	 8/15	 4.2	Soil	Erosion	 17.4	 0/15	 0.0		 	 Total	(RR)=	 77.4		
4.3.2 	Tanner	Wash	Bridge		 The	resilience	rating	for	the	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	determined	using	the	Indicators	and	User	Cost	ratings	(Table	4-6)	and	Weights	(Table	4-10).	As	seen	in	Table	4-22,	the	resilience	rating	for	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	33.3.	
Table	4-22:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Rating	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x) ×R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 32.9	 6/15	 13.1	Extreme	Temperature	 20.6	 1/15	 1.4	Load	Path	 12.3	 15/15	 12.3	Failure	Mode	 12.3	 8/15	 6.6	Soil	Erosion	 21.9	 0/15	 0.00		 	 Total	(RR)=	 33.3		
4.3.3 	Earp	Wash	Bridge		 	 The	resilience	rating	for	the	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	determined	using	the	Indicators	and	User	Cost	ratings	(Table	4-11)	and	Weights	(Table	4-15).		As	seen	in	Table	4-23,	the	resilience	rating	for	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	43.9.		
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Table	4-23:	Earp	Wash	Bridge	Resilience	Rating	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x) ×R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 6.2	 8/15	 3.3	Extreme	Temperature	 7.7	 5/15	 2.6	Load	Path	 15.5	 5/15	 15.5	Failure	Mode	 64.4	 6/15	 25.8	Soil	Erosion	 6.2	 0/15	 0.0		 	 Total	(RR)=	 43.9		
4.3.4 	Midgley	Bridge		 	 The	resilience	rating	for	the	Midgley	Bridge	is	determined	using	the	Indicators	and	User	Cost	ratings	(Table	4-16)	and	Weights	(Table	4-20).		As	seen	in	Table	4-24,	the	resilience	rating	for	Midgley	Bridge	is	31.7.		
Table	4-24:	Midgley	Bridge	Resilience	Rating	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x) ×R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 7.7	 6/15	 3.1	Extreme	Temperature	 6.4	 9/15	 3.9	Load	Path	 42.9	 1/15	 2.9	Failure	Mode	 42.9	 8/15	 21.5	Soil	Erosion	 N/A	 N/A	 -		 	 Total	(RR)=	 31.7		
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5 Discussion	of	Results	
5.1 Overview		The	four	bridges	in	this	study	were	chosen	to	fit	into	categories	of	high	and	low	sufficiency	rating	and	high	and	low	expected	resilience	ratings.		The	following	discusses	the	resilience	and	sufficiency	ratings,	compares	and	contrasts	the	bridges,	and	a	susceptibility	analysis.	
5.2 Comparing	Resilience	and	Sufficiency	Rating			 Table	5-1	presents	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	for	the	four	bridges.	
Table	5-1:	Sufficiency	and	Resilience	Ratings	
Bridge	 Sufficiency	Rating	 Resilience	Rating	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	 99.90	 77.4	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	 77.10	 33.3	Earp	Wash	Bridge	 49.50	 43.9	Midgley	Bridge		 50.70	 31.7			 Figure	5-1	displays	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	for	the	four	bridges	in	a	bar	graph.		It	is	seen	that	there	is	no	correlation	between	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings.		The	line	shows	the	percent	difference	between	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings.	
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Figure	5-1:	Bar	Graph	of	Resilience	and	Sufficiency	Ratings	with	Percent	Differences	
5.2.1 	Coyote	Wash	Bridge		 Coyote	Wash	Bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	99.9	and	was	expected	to	have	a	high	resilience	rating,	as	well.			The	actual	resilience	rating	of	77.4	is	high	and	still	fits	into	the	category	of	high	sufficiency	and	high	resilience.		The	high	resilience	came	from	several	items.		The	bridge	has	drilled	shaft	foundations,	making	it	very	resilient	in	the	case	of	an	extreme	flood	event.		Coyote	Wash	Bridge	is	also	resilient	to	extreme	temperature	because	the	width	of	the	expansion	joints	present	on	the	structure	are	greater	than	the	deformation	caused	by	an	extreme	temperature	differential.		Having	six	girders	and	a	concrete	slab	makes	the	bridge	redundant.		This	redundancy	makes	the	bridge	resilient	because	loads	can	be	redistributed	with	the	loss	of	one	girder.			The	percent	difference	between	the	nominal	shear	and	moment	capacities	and	their	respective	strength	reduction	factors	was	high,	meaning	the	bridge	is	not	as	susceptible	to	a	sudden	unexpected	failure	that	occurs	with	little	to	no	
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warning.		The	bridge	was	built	in	2012,	so	all	of	the	condition	ratings	for	the	bridge	are	very	high.		The	ADT	is	only	1000	and	the	detour	length	is	only	1	mile.		These	factors	all	resulted	in	a	high	score	for	user	cost.			A	few	factors	decreased	the	resilience	rating	for	Coyote	Wash	Bridge.		The	bridge	has	scour	protection	for	the	bank,	but	not	for	the	waterway	floor	or	flow	control.		Although	the	scour	protection	countermeasure	for	the	bank	is	resilient,	the	lowest	of	the	three	item’s	scores	is	used.		The	bridge	received	a	rating	of	0	for	soil	erosion.		Because	the	bridge	has	no	piers,	the	loss	of	an	abutment	would	likely	result	in	a	collapse	of	the	bridge,	making	it	less	resilient.		This	caused	the	consequence	of	event	for	the	bridge	to	be	high.		The	varying	ratings	and	weights	showed	a	high	sufficiency	led	to	a	high	resilience	in	this	case.	
5.2.2 	Tanner	Wash	Bridge		 Tanner	Wash	Bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	77.10	and	was	expected	to	have	a	low	resilience	rating.		The	actual	resilience	rating	of	33.3	shows	that	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	accurately	fits	into	the	category	of	high	sufficiency	and	low	resilience	rating.		 	Several	items	led	to	the	low	resilience	rating	of	Tanner	Wash	Bridge.		The	foundations	of	the	abutments	and	piers	are	spread	on	bedrock.		Although	it	is	beneficial	to	have	a	foundation	on	bedrock,	the	lack	of	piles	or	drilled	shafts	makes	it	less	resilient.		The	bridge	also	has	no	scour	protection	countermeasures	for	the	flow	control,	waterway	floor,	or	bank.		This	resulted	in	a	rating	of	0/15	for	soil	erosion,	making	it	non-resilient	in	this	category.		The	detour	length	of	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	at	least	99	miles	as	seen	in	the	SI&A	report,	making	the	user	cost	for	the	bridge	low	and	subsequently	lowering	the	resilience.				 Some	factors	helped	increase	the	resilience	rating	of	the	bridge.		The	bridge	is	redundant,	having	five	girders	and	a	concrete	slab.		This	makes	the	bridge	more	resilient	
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because	the	load	can	be	redistributed	in	the	case	of	the	loss	of	a	single	girder.		The	ratio	between	the	flexural	and	shear	failure	modes	and	their	accompanying	strength	reduction	factors	is	also	high.		This	means	that	the	bridge	will	most	likely	experience	a	flexural	failure,	when	warning	signs	will	precede	failure.		The	high	ratio	makes	the	bridge	more	resilient.		In	this	case,	the	varying	ratings	and	weights	show	that	a	high	sufficiency	rating	is	not	indicative	of	a	high	resilience	rating.	
5.2.3 	Earp	Wash	Bridge		 Earp	Wash	Bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	49.50	and	was	expected	to	have	a	high	resilience	rating.		The	actual	resilience	rating	is	43.9,	meaning	that	the	bridge	does	not	fit	into	the	expected	category	of	low	sufficiency	and	high	resilience	rating.	However,	the	resilience	rating	is	higher	than	those	for	Tanner	Wash	and	Midgley	Bridges.		 Several	factors	led	to	the	low	resilience	rating	of	Earp	Wash	Bridge.		The	bridge	is	not	resilient	to	extreme	temperature.		The	four-span	bridge	is	integral	with	its	supports	and	the	extreme	temperature	change	induces	a	stress	of	2810	psi.		However,	due	to	the	bridge’s	age,	the	compressive	strength	of	the	concrete	is	only	3000	psi.		Thus,	the	stresses	induced	from	an	extreme	change	in	temperature	are	more	than	50%	of	the	compressive	strength.		In	addition,	the	bridge	has	no	scour	protection	for	the	flow	control	or	waterway	floor.		The	controlling	scour	protection	countermeasure	rated	0,	making	the	bridge	non-resilient	to	scour.		The	load	rating	for	the	bridge	is	not	up	to	the	HL-93	standards	and	had	an	ADT	of	34,500.		This	makes	the	user	cost	rating	low.				 The	bridge	demonstrates	resilient	characteristics.		The	foundations	are	steel	H	piles	and	are	driven	to	a	depth	of	approximately	30	feet	into	the	ground.		Thus,	the	piers	and	abutments	are	not	susceptible	to	washout.		In	addition,	the	structure	is	redundant.		Loads	
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can	be	redistributed	in	the	case	of	a	loss	of	a	section	of	slab	reinforcement,	making	it	more	resilient	to	a	change	in	load	path.		The	strength	reduction	factor	ratio	is	also	high,	which	means	the	bridge	is	not	likely	to	experience	a	sudden,	unexpected	failure	due	to	shear.		In	this	case,	it	is	seen	that	a	low	sufficiency	rating	is	correlated	with	a	low	resilience	rating.	
5.2.4 	Midgley	Bridge		 Midgley	Bridge	has	a	sufficiency	rating	of	50.70	and	was	expected	to	have	a	low	resilience	rating.		The	actual	resilience	rating	is	31.7,	meaning	this	bridge	did	meet	the	expectation	of	having	a	low	resilience	rating.		 The	biggest	factor	leading	to	the	low	resilience	rating	for	Midgley	Bridge	is	its	designation	as	a	fracture	critical	structure.		The	non-redundancy	of	the	structure	means	that	the	loss	of	a	fracture	critical	member	could	result	in	a	partial	or	complete	loss	of	the	entire	structure.		This	gave	the	bridge	a	rating	of	‘1’	for	load	path,	which	had	a	40.8%	weight	on	the	resilience	rating.		The	fracture	critical	designation	also	means	that	failure	through	load	path	or	failure	mode	could	cause	a	collapse	of	the	entire	structure.		The	consequence	of	these	two	resilience	indicators	would	render	the	bridge	out	of	service,	making	it	costly	to	the	user.		In	addition,	the	bridge	had	a	low	rating	for	the	foundation	type	due	to	the	spread	footing	foundation.		Although	the	bridge	is	not	susceptible	to	scour,	it	is	susceptible	to	falling	boulders	and	seismic	activity.		The	user	cost	rated	low	due	to	the	detour	length	of	38	miles	and	the	ADT	of	3858.		 The	highest	rating	Midgley	Bridge	received	was	for	the	extreme	temperature	resilience	indicator.		The	bridge	has	two	expansion	joints	that	are	each	2	in.	long.		The	change	in	length	of	the	structure	due	to	an	extreme	temperature	differential	is	2.59	in.		This	means	that	if	the	bridge	were	to	experience	an	extreme	change	in	temperature,	the	
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expansion	joints	would	be	able	to	accommodate	the	change	in	length	without	inducing	any	additional	stress	in	the	structure.	
5.3 Comparison		
5.3.1 	Weight	Factors			 The	weights	for	all	four	bridges	are	compared	in	this	section	and	Table	5-2	presents	the	weights	for	the	capacity	measures	for	each	bridge.			
Table	5-2:	Weights	(%)	for	All	Bridges	
Bridge	 Foundation	Type	
Support	
Type	 Redundancy	
Strength	
Reduction	Factors	
Scour	
Protection	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	 60.2	 5.4	 8.1	 8.1	 18.1	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	 37.5	 15	 11.3	 11.3	 25	Earp	Wash	Bridge	 11	 6.9	 13.8	 57.3	 11	Midgley	Bridge	 12.2	 6.1	 40.8	 40.8	 -		 It	is	seen	for	Tanner	and	Coyote	Wash	bridges,	the	lowest	weights	were	for	redundancy	(load	path)	and	strength	reduction	factor	(failure	mode).		This	is	likely	because	both	these	two	bridges	have	AASHTO	type	prestressed	concrete	girders	and	a	concrete	deck.		The	highest	weight	for	both	the	Tanner	and	Coyote	Wash	bridges	is	for	foundation	type	(pier	or	abutment	washout).		However,	the	weight	is	much	higher	for	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	at	almost	a	50%	weight.		This	is	because	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	does	not	have	piers,	while	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	does.		Thus,	the	loss	of	an	abutment	on	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	would	result	in	a	complete	failure.	In	contrast,	the	highest	weight	for	Earp	Wash	Bridge	and	Midgley	Bridge	is	redundancy	(failure	mode),	which	was	the	lowest	for	both	Tanner	and	Coyote	Wash	
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Bridges.		This	high	weight	factor	for	Earp	Wash	Bridge	is	because	of	a	high	rating	for	consequence	of	event	and	replacement	cost,	which	both	received	a	5.		Thus,	damage	to	the	deck,	which	is	the	entire	superstructure,	would	result	in	a	sudden	failure	and	require	a	significant	replacement	cost.	Similarly,	if	the	deck	were	to	fail	with	little	to	no	warning,	the	bridge	would	be	out	of	service.		The	lowest	weights	for	Earp	Wash	Bridge	are	pier	and	abutment	washout	and	soil	erosion.		These	are	low	because	the	bridge	has	piers	and	the	failure	of	one	would	redirect	load	to	the	other	piers	and	abutments.	The	high	weight	for	redundancy	in	Midgley	Bridge	is	because	a	loss	of	a	fracture	critical	member	could	result	in	a	complete	failure	of	the	bridge.		The	lowest	weights	for	Midgley	Bridge	were	foundation	type	and	support	type.		The	foundation	type	had	a	low	weight	because	it	is	not	subjected	to	scour,	making	the	replacement	cost,	consequence,	and	user	cost	very	low.		The	low	weight	for	support	type	is	because	the	deck	allows	for	thermal	expansion	without	adding	stress	into	the	bridge.			
5.3.2 	Capacity	Measures		 The	following	section	compares	the	capacity	measure	ratings	for	each	bridge.		Table	5-3	displays	the	ratings	for	all	four	bridges.			
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Table	5-3:	Capacity	Measure	Ratings	for	All	Bridges	
Capacity	Measure	
Coyote	Wash	
Bridge	
Tanner	Wash	
Bridge	
Earp	Wash	
Bridge	
Midgley	
Bridge	Foundation	Type	 15/15	 6/15	 8/15	 6/15	Support	Type	 13/15	 1/15	 3/15	 9/15	Redundancy	 15/15	 15/15	 15/15	 1/15	Strength	Reduction	Factor	 8/15	 8/15	 6/15	 8/15	Scour	Protection	 0/15	 0/15	 0/15	 N/A			 As	shown	in	Table	5-3,	all	bridges	susceptible	to	scour	received	a	rating	of	0	for	scour	protection.		Even	though	Coyote	and	Earp	Wash	bridges	had	scour	protection	countermeasures	for	the	bank,	there	were	none	for	flow	control	or	the	waterway	floor.		This	caused	these	two	bridges	to	receive	the	same	score	as	Tanner	Wash	Bridge,	which	had	no	scour	protection	countermeasures.				 Coyote	Wash,	Tanner	Wash,	and	Midgley	Bridges	also	all	received	a	rating	of	8	for	strength	reduction	factor.		The	bridges	had	a	strength	reduction	factor	rating	between	-0.09	and	1.50	(Appendix	C),	which	means	the	load	causing	a	ductile	failure	is	likely	to	occur	before	the	load	causing	a	brittle	failure.				 Coyote	Wash	Bridge	has	more	capacity	measure	values	of	15	than	any	of	the	other	bridges.		This	is	because	it	is	founded	on	drilled	shaft	foundations	and	a	high	level	of	redundancy.		Tanner	and	Earp	Wash	Bridges	also	received	a	rating	of	15	for	load	path	due	to	their	relatively	high	redundancies.		Other	than	these,	no	other	capacity	measures	were	rated	as	high	as	15.		 Midgley	Bridge	scored	the	lowest	for	redundancy	with	a	rating	of	1.		Other	than	the	ratings	of	0	for	scour	protection,	this	is	the	lowest	rating	for	any	bridge’s	capacity	measure.		
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The	reason	for	the	low	rating	is	because	of	the	lack	of	redundant	load	paths.	In	other	words,	since	Midgley	Bridge	is	a	fracture	critical	structure,	the	loss	of	one	member	will	likely	result	in	the	collapse	of	the	entire	structure.				 Midgley	and	Tanner	Wash	Bridges	both	received	a	rating	of	6	for	the	foundation	type	of	spread	footing	on	bedrock.		Spread	footings	receive	a	low	score	relative	to	drilled	shaft	or	pile	foundations.	Drilled	shaft	and	pile	foundations	are	more	resilient	to	the	effects	of	an	unforeseen	event	since	they	are	driven	several	feet	into	the	ground.		Earp	Wash	Bridge	received	a	rating	of	8	for	foundation	type	since	the	bridge	is	founded	on	steel	piles,	which	are	more	resilient	than	spread	footings.		 Earp	Wash	Bridge	received	a	rating	of	3	for	support	type.		This	is	a	result	of	the	low	compressive	strength	of	concrete	used	in	the	bridge.		Due	to	the	bridge’s	age,	the	compressive	strength	of	the	concrete	is	only	3000	psi.		The	stress	induced	by	a	temperature	differential	of	125°	F	would	exceed	50%	of	the	compressive	strength.		Tanner	Wash	Bridge	received	a	rating	of	1	for	support	type	because	the	ration	between	the	actual	expansion	joint	width	and	the	deformation	due	to	temperature	change	is	less	than	one.			This	means	if	the	bridge	were	subjected	to	an	extreme	change	in	temperature,	stresses	would	be	induced	once	the	expansion	joint	length	was	filled.	
5.3.3 	Resilience	Ratings		 The	following	section	compares	the	resilience	ratings	for	all	four	bridges,	as	shown	in	Table	5-4.		
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Table	5-4:	Resilience	Ratings	for	All	Bridges	
Resilience	
Indicator	
Coyote	Wash	
Bridge	
Tanner	Wash	
Bridge	
Earp	Wash	
Bridge	
Midgley	
Bridge	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 60.24	 15	 5.9	 4.9	Extreme	Temperature	 4.7	 1	 1.4	 3.7	Load	Path	 8.1	 11.3	 13.8	 2.7	Failure	Mode	 4.3	 6	 22.9	 20.4	Soil	Erosion	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 -	Total	(%)=	Resilience	Rating	(RR)	 77.4	 33.3	 43.9	 31.7			 It	is	logical	that	the	highest	resilience	rating	was	for	Coyote	Wash	Bridge.		This	bridge	has	drilled	shaft	foundations,	redundancy,	and	the	ability	to	accommodate	a	change	in	length	due	to	an	extreme	temperature	differential.		Being	built	in	2012,	this	bridge	is	also	in	very	good	condition.		It	was	built	to	current	design	and	loading	standards.			It	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	this	bridge	had	the	highest	resilience	rating	of	the	four	bridges.					 Although	Earp	Wash	Bridge	was	anticipated	to	have	a	high	resilience	rating,	a	few	factors	logically	bring	the	resilience	down.		The	bridge	had	a	high	weight	for	failure	mode	because	the	bridge	would	be	rendered	out	of	service.		Even	though	the	bridge	has	pile	foundations,	they	receive	an	average	rating.		The	weight	for	pier	or	abutment	washout	was	also	fairly	low.		This	bridge	was	also	built	in	the	1950’s	and	not	designed	to	the	current	loading	standards.		The	compressive	strength	of	the	concrete	is	also	fairly	low	to	what	is	typically	used	in	new	construction.	It	is	reasonable	that	the	bridge	received	such	a	low	resilience	rating.		 It	was	anticipated	to	see	a	low	resilience	rating	for	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	and	it	is	rational.		The	bridge	has	only	a	spread	footing,	which	is	less	resilient	than	other	types	of	
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foundations	typically	used	in	bridges.		The	pier	or	abutment	washout	also	had	a	high	weight	because	it	could	render	the	bridge	out	of	service,	reasonably	bringing	the	resilience	rating	down.		The	large	detour	length	also	means	that	there	is	a	high	cost	to	the	user	if	the	bridge	were	rendered	out	of	service,	so	it	is	logical	that	this	factor	would	decrease	the	resilience	rating.				 It	is	understandable	that	Midgley	Bridge	had	the	lowest	resilience	rating	than	any	other	bridge	in	the	study.		The	bridge	is	classified	as	fracture	critical,	which	negatively	affects	the	bridge’s	resilience.		This	is	logical	because	a	non-redundant	structure	can	experience	a	partial	or	complete	failure	from	the	failure	of	one	component.		This	bridge	was	also	built	in	the	1940’s	and	not	up	to	current	loading	standards.		It	is	clear	that	these	factors	would	decrease	the	resilience	rating	for	Midgley	Bridge.	
5.4 Susceptibility	Analysis	
5.4.1 	Overview		 An	analysis	is	performed	to	determine	the	susceptibility	of	the	resilience	rating	to	bridge	improvements	or	deteriorations.		It	is	expected	that	improvements	would	increase	and	deterioration	would	decrease	the	resilience	ratings.		The	following	presents	section	several	hypothetical	scenarios,	which	demonstrate	how	receptive	the	resilience	rating	is	to	change.	
5.4.2 	Changes	Resulting	in	a	Lower	Resilience	Rating		 The	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	had	the	highest	resilience	rating	of	any	other	bridge	in	the	study.		Suppose,	over	time,	the	bridge	underwent	deterioration	without	repair.		The	structure	would	remain	the	same,	so	the	foundation	type,	support	type,	redundancy,	and	
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strength	reduction	factor	ratings	would	not	change.		However,	this	could	cause	the	bridge	to	become	scour	critical	and	subsequent	condition	ratings	to	decrease.	If	the	bridge	were	to	become	scour	critical,	the	rating	for	scour	protection	would	remain	a	0/15.		However,	this	would	change	the	consequence	of	event	for	soil	erosion.		If	the	bridge	were	to	experience	soil	erosion	in	addition	to	being	scour	critical,	loss	of	an	abutment	could	happen,	causing	the	bridge	to	be	out	of	service.		This	would	also	increase	the	weight	of	the	consequence	of	event	for	soil	erosion,	causing	the	rating	to	go	from	a	2	to	a	5.		This	would	also	make	the	user	cost	increase	in	weight,	causing	the	rate	to	change	from	1.5	to	5.	In	addition,	if	a	condition	rating,	appraisal	rating,	or	both	were	decreased,	ADT	increased,	or	combination,	the	user	cost	would	have	a	lower	weight.		For	example,	if	the	condition	rating	for	the	deck	condition	decreased	from	a	7	to	a	4,	the	condition	rating	for	the	superstructure	decreased	from	an	8	to	a	3,	the	appraisal	rating	for	waterway	adequacy	dropped	from	an	8	to	a	4,	and	the	ADT	increased	from	1,000	to	32,000,	the	user	cost	would	drop	from	a	14.95	to	an	11.81.		This	would	cause	the	user	cost	rating	to	increase	from	a	1.5	to	2.		As	a	result,	the	resilience	rating	would	decrease	from	a	77.4	to	a	37.9,	as	shown	in	Table	5-5.	
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Table	5-5:	Coyote	Wash	Bridge	Susceptibility	Analysis	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x)*R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 24.0	 15/15	 24.0	Extreme	Temperature	 7.2	 15/15	 7.2	Load	Path	 4.3	 15/15	 4.3	Failure	Mode	 4.3	 8/15	 2.31	Soil	Erosion	 60.1	 0/15	 0.0		 	 Total	(RR)=	 37.9		
5.4.3 	Changes	Resulting	in	a	Higher	Resilience	Rating		 Tanner	Wash	Bridge	had	the	second	lowest	resilience	rating	of	any	other	bridge	in	the	study.		There	are	several	ways	this	bridge	could	be	improved.		For	example,	suppose	the	bridge	had	scour	protection	countermeasures	installed	for	flow	control,	floor	protection,	and	bank	protection.		If	an	outlet	structure	were	installed	to	control	flow,		rock	riprap	were	installed	on	the	floor,	and	the	bank	protection	of	the	waterway	remained	the	same,	the	coding	in	the	SI&A	report	would	go	from	a	‘0’	to	a	‘4’	for	all	three	items.		This	would	cause	the	rating	for	scour	protection	would	go	from	a	0/15	to	a	7/15.		Also,	if	the	bridge	had	reconstruction	to	improve	the	foundations,	the	rating	for	pier	and	abutment	washout	would	increase.		Suppose	that	the	spread	footings	were	replaced	with	drilled	shafts.		This	would	cause	the	rating	for	pier	or	abutment	washout	to	go	from	a	6/15	to	a	15/15.		 Also,	suppose,	additional	routes	were	added	to	the	existing	transportation	network	near	Tanner	Wash	Bridge.		Currently,	the	detour	length	for	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	is	coded	‘99’	in	the	SI&A	report,	which	means	the	detour	is	at	least	99	miles	long.		If	the	detour	
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length	were	reduced	from	99	miles	to,	say,	20	miles,	the	user	cost	would	increase	from	4.70	to	12.92	and	the	rating	for	user	cost	would	go	from	3	to	1.5.		The	changes	discussed	above	would	cause	the	resilience	rating	of	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	to	go	from	33.33	to	a	77.0,	as	shown	in	Table	5-6.	
Table	5-6:	Tanner	Wash	Bridge	Susceptibility	Analysis	
Resilience	Indicator	 Weight,	W(x)	 Rating,	R(x)	 W(x)*R(x)	Pier/Abutment	Washout	 32.9	 15/15	 32.9	Extreme	Temperature	 20.5	 11/15	 15.0	Load	Path	 12.3	 15/15	 12.3	Failure	Mode	 12.3	 8/15	 6.6	Soil	Erosion	 21.9	 7/15	 10.22		 	 Total	(RR)=	 77.0		
5.5 Implication	of	Results		 The	implication	from	this	study	is	that	the	sufficiency	rating	alone	is	not	enough	of	a	measure	to	allocate	maintenance	and	repair	funds.		While	the	sufficiency	rating	is	an	important	measure,	the	resilience	rating	provides	additional,	useful	information.		The	sufficiency	rating	results	in	a	high	score	for	new	bridges	with	robust	foundations	and	components	that	are	in	good	condition.	However,	it	is	illustrated	that	the	sufficiency	rating	is	weakly	correlated	to	the	resiliency	rating.	Thus,	current	bridge	assessment	methodologies	are	not	adequately	adapting	to	the	changing	environment.			As	seen	from	the	results	of	this	study,	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	are	not	correlated-	a	high	sufficiency	rating	is	not	indicative	of	a	high	resilience	rating.		A	bridge	
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with	a	high	sufficiency	rating	yet	a	low	resilience	rating	may	be	functional	and	in	good	condition,	but	may	not	be	able	to	quickly	adapt	to	or	recover	from	an	extreme	event.		The	resilience	rating	takes	into	account	some	aspects	of	condition,	but	the	impacts	on	the	rating	are	small.		Although	a	sufficiency	rating	is	still	a	good	measure	of	the	condition	and	functionality	of	a	bridge,	it	is	incomplete	without	a	measure	of	resilience.		Therefore,	these	two	ratings	should	be	viewed	separately	and	in	parallel	when	making	funding	decisions.	 		 Adapting	resilient	practices	into	the	design,	construction,	and	maintenance	of	the	nation’s	bridges	is	an	integral	step	in	improving	infrastructure	quality.		With	the	increase	in	extreme	and/or	uncommon	events,	there	is	a	need	to	determine	how	well	a	bridge	can	adapt,	overcome,	and	minimize	the	impacts	of	these	events.		The	proposed	method	quantitatively	measures	a	bridge’s	level	of	resilience	and,	with	the	sufficiency	rating,	provides	in-depth	and	complete	information	about	the	condition	of	a	bridge.		The	method	is	also	easily	implementable	due	to	its	use	of	information	already	on	hand.		With	the	implementation	of	this	resilience	measure	into	routine	bridge	maintenance,	disasters	will	be	more	easily	prevented.		
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6 Conclusion	
6.1 Summary		The	overall	objective	of	this	study	was	to	incorporate	resilience	into	the	design,	construction,	and	maintenance	of	structures.		Current	bridge	inspection	procedures	and	condition	assessments	do	not	directly	include	resilience	in	their	procedures.		However,	exceptionally	intense	and	increasingly	frequent	weather	events	underscore	a	pressing	need	to	improve	the	resilience	of	our	infrastructure.		In	response,	the	goal	of	this	study	is	to	develop	an	approach	to	quantify	resilience.		This	is	accomplished	by	first	reviewing	the	literature	and	state	of	the	art	of	structural	resilience	and	current	sufficiency	rating	practices.		Given	these	practices,	a	methodology	for	rating	resilience	was	developed.		Then,	four	case	study	bridges	with	varying	combinations	of	high	and	low	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings	were	selected	for	a	comparative	case	study.		These	bridges	were	analyzed	and	the	method	to	quantify	resilience	was	adjusted	as	needed.		All	four	bridges	are	then	rated	for	resilience	and	the	resilience	ratings	are	compared	to	their	sufficiency	ratings.				The	impacts	of	maintenance	and	improved	design	were	examined	to	determine	their	effect	on	the	resilience	rating.		The	final	product	was	an	easily	adaptable	design	methodology.		As	predicted,	it	is	shown	that	a	high	sufficiency	rating	is	not	indicative	of	a	high	resilience	rating.		In	other	words,	there	is	no	direct	correlation	between	the	sufficiency	and	resilience	ratings.	
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6.2 Implications	of	Results	The	results	from	this	study	have	implications	for	improvement	of	transportation	infrastructure	design,	construction,	and	maintenance.		The	results	show	that	current	sufficiency	rating	scores	(Table	5-1)	are	not	an	adequate	indicator	of	a	bridge’s	resilience.	In	short,	the	sufficiency	rating	does	not	measure	a	bridge’s	resilience.		Quantifying	a	bridge’s	condition,	functionality,	and	usefulness	does	not	determine	whether	a	bridge	can	adapt	to,	quickly	recover	from,	or	reduce	the	impacts	of	an	unforeseen	event.		Clearly,	these	two	ratings	have	separate	but	comparable	importance.		In	other	words,	neither	can	stand	alone	when	determining	the	overall	state	of	a	bridge.	Resilience	can	be	suitably	quantified	using	the	methodology	proposed	in	this	thesis.		As	expected,	the	resilience	rating	is	sensitive	to	the	condition	and/or	design	details	of	a	bridge.	The	susceptibility	study	performed	in	this	thesis	showed	if	a	bridge	were	to	deteriorate	over	time,	the	resilience	rating	decreased.		It	also	confirmed	if	a	bridge	received	improvements,	the	resilience	rating	increased.		This	shows	that	the	resilience	rating	is	as	fluid	as	the	sufficiency	rating.		It	can	change	over	time	and	the	difference	in	the	resilience	ratings	will	demonstrate	how	the	resilience	of	the	structure	has	either	increased	or	decreased.	A	resilient	bridge	will	increase	public	safety,	and	reduce	the	occurrence	of	unpredictable	maintenance	or	construction	costs.		For	example,	if	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	(Section	2.2.3.2)	had	drilled	shaft	foundations,	it	likely	would	have	withstood	the	intense	precipitation	event	that	washed	out	its	abutment.		Furthermore,	had	the	I-35W	Bridge	(Section	2.2.3.2)	contained	redundant	load	paths,	it	may	have	only	sustained	partial	damage	during	an	unusual	loading	event.	Clearly,	if	these	two	bridges	had	been	more	
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resilient,	the	catastrophic	losses	would	have	been	mitigated.		The	results	of	this	study	indicate	that	quantifying	resilience	is	beneficial	to	improving	bridge	design	and	performance	in	the	wake	of	rapid	climatic	changes	and	an	aging	infrastructure.				Since	this	approach	aims	to	identify	non-resilient	bridges,	it	can	be	concluded	that	disasters	like	the	Tex	Wash	and	I-35W	bridges	could	be	prevented.		Had	the	Tex	Wash	Bridge	been	rated	for	resilience,	the	foundations	present	before	the	2015	collapse	would	have	reduced	the	rating	for	pier/abutment	washout	and	raised	the	weights	for	user	cost	and	consequence	of	event.		These	would	likely	cause	the	bridge	to	have	a	low	resilience	rating	similar	to	that	of	Tanner	Wash	Bridge.		The	I-35W	Bridge	would	likely	have	had	a	resilience	rating	similar	to	the	Midgley	Bridge.		Due	to	its	non-redundant	substructure,	the	I-35W	Bridge	is	also	fracture	critical.		This	would	cause	the	redundancy	rating	to	be	‘1’	and	the	user	cost	and	consequence	of	event	weights	to	rise.		Since	these	two	bridges	would	have	likely	had	low	resilience	ratings	before	their	collapse,	preventative	and/or	corrective	actions	could	have	been	taken	to	avoid	these	tragedies.				 	
6.3 Applications	of	Results	An	important	goal	of	this	study	is	to	develop	an	approach	for	quantifying	resilience	that	is	easily	adaptable	by	state	departments	of	transportation.			As	a	result,	much	of	the	information	needed	to	use	the	proposed	methodology	is	collected	directly	from	a	bridge’s	SI&A	report.		Other	information	is	found	on	the	as-built	construction	drawings	or	existing	inspection	documents.		By	utilizing	existing	information,	the	implementation	of	the	resilience	rating	approach	is	straightforward.			
115		
Additionally,	the	development	of	resilience	rating	procedure	will	aid	in	implementing	resiliency	into	design	practice.		That	is,	components	of	a	bridge	that	are	affected	by	changes	in	resilience	are	more	easily	identified.		This	allows	decision	makers	and	designers	to	identify	those	portions	of	a	bridge	where	improvements	will	most	effectively	benefit	the	transportation	system	as	a	whole.	
6.4 Limitations	of	Study		 It	is	important	to	emphasize	a	limitation	of	this	study	because	this	is	an	area	for	future	development.		Given	the	scope	of	this	study,	the	capacity	measures	are	simplified.		For	example,	the	rating	for	foundation	type	is	simply	based	on	the	foundation	code	listed	in	the	SI&A	report.		It	does	not	take	into	account	the	foundation	embedment	depth,	typical	flow	conditions,	or	flood	event	flow	conditions.		Another	example	is	the	capacity	measure	for	scour	protection.		This	was	rated	solely	based	on	the	countermeasures	listed	in	the	SI&A	report	for	the	floor,	bank,	and	flow	control.		In	other	words,	there	was	no	in-depth	scour	analysis	performed	to	determine	if	the	countermeasures	were	sufficient.				 Given	the	limitation	highlight	above,	the	resilience	rating	approach	developed	in	this	thesis	can	be	further	adapted,	modified,	and	refined.		One	recommendation	is	to	refine	the	procedure	for	rating	the	capacity	measures.		For	example,	the	rating	for	foundations	could	incorporate	the	embedment	depth	and	flow	conditions.		In	addition,	the	rating	for	scour	protection	has	the	ability	to	be	improved	through	an	in-depth	scour	analysis.		By	comparing	the	results	of	the	in-depth	analysis	to	the	bridge’s	current	scour	protection	countermeasures,	the	adequacy	of	those	countermeasures	can	be	determined.	
116		
6.5 Conclusions	Given	the	need	for	an	approach	for	rating	bridge	resilience	and	the	above	results	and	limitations,	the	following	conclusions	have	been	reached:	
• A	sufficiency	rating	alone	is	not	enough	to	make	informed	decisions	on	fund	allocation	for	bridges.	
• The	sufficiency	rating	is	not	correlated	to	the	resilience	rating.		Both	quantities	are	needed	to	understand	the	condition	of	bridges.			
• The	approach	given	in	this	thesis	is	easily	adaptable	and	sensitive	to	the	primary	factors	known	to	influence	the	resilience	of	a	bridge.	
• The	framework	for	deriving	the	approach	to	quantify	resilience	in	bridges	is	detailed	in	full.		Users	can	update	this	approach	to	meet	their	specific	needs.	Increasing	severity	in	weather	events	has	created	a	need	to	include	resilience	in	structures.		Current	aging	infrastructure	was	not	designed	to	meet	new	increased	demands.	Previous	solutions	to	this	problem	are	unsatisfactory.		Current	proposed	methods	to	quantify	structural	resilience	are	insufficient	because	they	are	specific	to	certain	events,	(e.g.	a	combined	instance	of	scour	and	earthquake),	the	approach	is	retroactive,	unformulated	approaches	are	utilized,	or	they	are	specific	to	certain	regions	of	the	country	(e.g.	those	subjected	to	permafrost).		Developing	an	approach	to	quantify	bridge	resilience	will	not	only	allow	for	more	informed	decisions	when	allocating	repair	and	replacement	funds,	but	will	benefit	network	users,	including	residents	and	the	trucking	industry.		Resilient	bridges	will	be	able	to	withstand,	quickly	recover	from,	and/or	minimize	the	consequences	of	an	extreme	event.	The	approach	proposed	in	this	thesis	incorporates	components	from	previously	proposed	resilience	quantification	methods	and	resulted	in	a	
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method	that	encompasses	all	bridges	in	the	NBI	and	that	is	adaptable	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	user.		
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Appendices	
Appendix	A:	Support	Type	Calculations		
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Appendix	B:	Load	Path	vs.	Redundancy	Calculation		
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Coyote	Wash	Bridge
Mbridge 114589.9 k-ft
Melement 15187.82 k-ft
R 0.867459
Earp	Wash	Bridge
Mbridge 11936.18 k-in
Melement 293.5102 k-in
R 0.97541
Tanner	Wash	Bridge
Mbridge 27222.65 k-ft
Melement 3303.67 k-ft
R 0.878643
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Appendix	C:	Failure	Mode	vs	Strength	Reduction	Factor	
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137		
Appendix	D:	User	Cost
	
S3 14.953125 S1 55 S2 30
A 0.046875 A 0 J 0
k 1 B 0 G 0
ADT 1000 H 0
DL 1 I 0
B 0 A 0
B 0
C 0
D
E 0
F 0
X 500
Y 21
S3 9.950596107 S1 22.07797 S2 23
A 3.049403893 A 25 J 7
k 0.53032906 B 7.92203 G 0
ADT 34500 H 0
DL 1 I 0
B 2 A 3
B 2
C 2
D
E 0
F 0
X 11500
Y 16.26667
S3 4.697447814 S1 54.46097 S2 30
A 10.30255219 A 0 J 0
k 0.993658519 B 0.539026 G 0
ADT 2206 H 0
DL 99 I 0
B 0 A 0
B 0
C 0
D
E 0
F 0
X 1103
Y 22
S3 6.895924486 S1 47.07797 S2 25
A 8.104075514 A 0 J 5
k 0.847976119 B 7.92203 G 0
ADT 3858 H 0
DL 38 I 0
B 0 A 0
B 1
C 4
D
E 0
F 0
X 1929
Y 12
Coyote	Wash	Bridge
Earp	Wash	Bridge
Tanner	Wash	Bridge
Midgley	Bridge
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Appendix	E:	Replacement	Cost	
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Appendix	F:	Midgley	Bridge	High	Stressed	Members		
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Appendix	G:	Midgley	Bridge	Connections	
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